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ABSTRACT 
National parks in developing countries often have inhabitants that practice 
communal land management. Potential drivers for sustainable communal land 
management have been identified in literature, however these drivers appear to vary 
from case to case and their validity remains to be further tested.  The objectives of this 
research are to understand the factors that promote and deter; park promoted 
conservation, overharvesting, overgrazing, and trust in members to follow the rules. 
This study focuses on Cumbres de Monterrey National Park in Mexico. 
Household surveys were conducted amongst 14 communities that reside in or have 
boarders with the National Park. Using survey data, logistic regressions were performed 
to identify the influencing factors of perceived overharvesting, overgrazing, park 
promoted conservation, and trust in members to follow the rules.  Overgrazing rules 
were perceived to be just and external government punishment was associated with 
reduced perceptions in overgrazing.  Overharvesting rules were not perceived to be just 
and external government punishment was associated with perceptions of overharvesting.  
As a result, rules that are not perceived as just can result in possible retaliation 
harvesting.  Comunidades were more likely to report overgrazing than ejidos.  Current 
compensation for labor in the park is affiliated with reduced perceptions of park 
promoted conservation.  A local compensation program from water fees that is voluntary 
and has land owner involvement in encouraged.  Recipients of government assistance are 
more likely to report there is overgrazing.  There are decreasing levels of trust of 
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members to follow the rules when rule breakers are punished, sustainable harvest 
allowances are encouraged.   
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Problem Statement 
Conversation promotion through the establishment of national parks is a means 
to preserve nature and ecosystem services that are vital for humans.  The establishment 
of National Parks is quite new, over half of the National Parks were created in the last 
fifty years (Dudley et al., 2011).  The growth of protected areas, particularly in 
developing countries has grown exponentially over the past 25 years.  The mission of 
protected areas in developing countries has shifted from focusing solely on conservation 
to that of including aspects for improving human welfare.  This has resulted in a shift in 
favor to allow local resource use (Naughton-Treves et al., 2005).  The International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has classified protected areas into six 
categories that range from areas that strictly limit human activity to those that allow for 
sustainable use (IUCN, 2013).  Human population growth on the borders of protected 
areas in Latin America and Africa is double the average of rural population growth rates 
and it positively correlated with funding (Wittemyer et al., 2008).  The establishment of 
the first parks in Mexico created land tenure conflicts.  President Lazaro Cárdenas 
recommended that the establishment of parks should guarantee communal land tenure 
(Velázquez, 2012).  Communal land management is not only common in many parks in 
Mexico but also globally, where an estimated two billion people maintain their 
subsistence based livelihoods (ILC, 2007).  Communal systems have often been 
characterized for overexploitation and degradation due to their open access nature 
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(Hardin, 1968). However, successful communal land management has been proven with 
a defined group of users with self-governance.  Proxy indicators for successful 
communal land management have been defined (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Wade, 1988 
& 1994; Ostrom, 1990). Successful communal land management inside national parks is 
important since resettlement schemes only work when they are truly voluntary (Schmidt-
Soltau & Brockington, 2007; Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau, 2006) and resettlement schemes 
are not always possible. Ecotourism, is not always profitable, or when it is, does not 
always derive income for all stakeholders (Tisdell, 1995).  While successful proxy 
indicators for management and institutional success have been theoretically and 
qualitatively defined (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Wade, 1988 & 1994; Ostrom, 1990), the 
list of variables that are important by locality differ (Agrawal, 2001).  Important 
differences exist among the types of collective-action problems that communities 
confront (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004).  Thus, research is needed in conservation areas 
where communities reside, to determine which variables hold significant relationships, 
and to provide information for improved conservation and collective outcomes.   
While there are various indicators for success, sustainability and excludability are 
common success proxies that are determined to be essential.  Sustainability is often used 
as a rough index for management success.  However, sustainability does not necessarily 
imply that resource utilization is optimal from either an ecological or economic 
standpoint (IUCN, 1980).  Excludability reflects successful governance that prevents 
communities from becoming an open access system that can result in the tragedy of the 
commons (Feeny et al., 1990).  Although sustainability and excludability are essential 
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components for communal land management success, perceptions of conservation must 
also be taken into consideration when looking at successful communal land management 
in National Parks.  
It is widely accepted that the long-term survival of protected areas in developing 
countries will be jeopardized if needs, aspirations, and attitudes of local people are not 
accounted for (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997; Raval, 1994; Kemf, 1993, West & Brechin, 
1991; McNeely, 1990; MacKinnon & MacKinnon 1986; Machlis & Tichnell, 1985).  
While many studies take into account conservation perceptions of park residents 
(Allendorf et al., 2007; Ormsby & Kaplin, 2005; Conforti et al., 2003; Marcus, 2001; 
Alexander, 2000; Natura, 1995; Ite, 1996), studies on conservation near parks often do 
not take into account governance, which could improve conservation outcomes (Balint, 
2006).  A gap exists in the literature where sustainability, excludability, and perceptions 
in conservation in national parks are studies in a holistic way.  An examination of the 
links between sustainability, excludability, and perceptions in conservation can improve 
ecological outcomes by evaluating multiple factors that can influence communal land 
management success in and around national parks.  
Good governance is linked to excludability, sustainability, and perceptions in 
conservation.  Baland & Platteau (1996), Wade (1988 & 1994), and Ostrom (1990) were 
all referring to excludability in their seminal works of successful communal land 
management when they referred to clear boundaries, ease of enforcement, and locally 
devised access and management of rules.  Excludability is an aspect of good governance 
that was deemed important for successful communal land management.  A critical aspect 
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of sustainability is resilience.  Interventions for resilience immediately confront 
governance.  Resilience can be improved through increased participation and 
deliberation, polycentric and multilayered institutions, and accountable authorities that 
pursue just distribution of benefits and involuntary risks (Lebel et al., 2006).  In a study 
conducted by Balint (2006), conservation was deterred by a lack of local governance in 
one community and good local governance in another community resulted in park 
promoted conservation.  In this study, indicators of governance are examined in relation 
to sustainability, perceptions in conservation, and excludability for communities that 
reside in and around Cumbres de Monterrey National Park in Northern Mexico. 
Cumbres de Monterrey National Park is an important conservation area that 
provides 70% of the water for the city of Monterrey (the 3
rd
 largest city in Mexico), is a 
habitat for many bird species, and the black bear (CONANP, 2013).  The park has a 
history of tension from surrounding areas appealing for its conservation.  The area was 
first declared a naturally protected area in 1939 by president Lázaro Cárdenas, after 
groups in the area asked for land concessions to maintain a hydrologic balance in the 
region.  Federal law protected communal land endowments (ejidos) in National Parks 
from expulsion.  Land pressures continued with the expansion of the nearby 
metropolitan area and President Manuel Ávila Camacho stated that urban expansion 
would be harmful and that lands should be utilized for agriculture for the good of the 
nation.  Agricultural exploitation was not a view that was held by all actors in the area.  
A national study of the Sierra Madre Oriental was conducted in 1996, which led to the 
state of Nuevo Leon requesting that the natural area receive National Park status.  The 
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area was declared a National Park in November 2000.  Many communities that 
traditionally resided in this area relied on livestock grazing, subsistence agriculture, and 
intensive agriculture (CONANP, 2007).  Since the formation of the park, trees and wild 
herbs are no longer able to be legally harvested, and animals must graze inside 
communal boundaries.  A wood mill was closed in one community, and park officials 
are not welcomed there.  The park agency and the Secretary of the Environment and 
Natural Resources (SEMERNAT) sanctioned bad natural resource use.  Some 
communities also internally sanctioned members.  Communities varied in their 
accessibility, with some near paved roads and many off dirt roads that can become 
impassible depending on the weather.  Many of the park residents rely on agriculture for 
subsistence and received governmental assistance.  Donkeys were a common mode of 
transit to pass through the steep slopes to get to the other side of a mountain or hillside. 
Sustainable management of pasture, forests, and rivers are important since the park lies 
in a watershed recharge zone.   
1.2 Objectives 
The overall goal of this dissertation was to understand how to promote 
conservation amongst park inhabitants in Cumbres de Monterrey National Park.  This 
study sought to determine the variables that influence the conservation of natural 
resources in the communal lands within or surrounding the National Park.   This study 
looked specifically at sustainability, excludability, and conservation promotion since 
they are important to further conservation outcomes.  As good governance is interlinked 
with all of these factors, governance indicators from Baland & Platteau (1996), Wade 
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(1988 & 1994), and Ostrom (1990) were included to determine which variables have 
significant relationships since these factors may differ by locality (Agrawal, 2001).  
Proxy indicators were used for sustainability, excludability, and conservation 
perceptions.  Sustainability here was measured using the indicators of overgrazing and 
overharvesting of natural resources other than pasture.  Excludability was measured by 
trust in members to follow the rules.  Perceptions in conservation were defined as 
adoption of park promoted conservation practices. This study sought to expand on 
communal success determinates by: 
 understanding the factors that promote or deter park promoted conservation 
perceptions; 
 understanding the factors that promote or deter overharvesting and overgrazing; 
and 
 understanding the factors that promote or deter trust in members who follow the 
rules. 
 understand if comunidades would have better resilience to respond to and prevent 
overgrazing 
 understand whether communities in the Cumbres de Monterrey National Park 
reduce overgrazing with or without external government sanctioning.   
 understand how the parks affects attitudes  
 understanding the factors that are likely to contribute to overgrazing on the 
communal lands in and near the National Park. 
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Knowing which factors of governance are related to each of these success determinants 
is essential to inform conservation policy and management within the park.  The long-
term survival of protected areas in developing countries will be jeopardized if needs, 
aspirations, and attitudes of local people are not accounted for (Ghimire & Pimbert, 
1997; Raval, 1994; Kemf, 1993; West & Brechin, 1991; McNeely, 1990; MacKinnon & 
MacKinnon, 1986; Machlis & Tichnell, 1985).  
1.2.1 Main Contribution of this Research 
           The main contribution of this research is to show that rules that are not perceived 
as just do not work.  Government punishment was associated with reduced overgrazing 
and increasing overharvesting.  The majority of the respondents (88.9%) believed that 
overgrazing rules were just and only 37.6% of respondents believed that overharvesting 
rules are just.  This study also compares ejido and comunidad management.  This is 
important because 40% of Mexican agrarian land is under communal tenure (Wilson & 
Thompson, 1993).  Ejidos in this study provide greater conservation benefits than 
comunidades. Comunidad members were more likely to state that there is overgrazing 
than ejido members.  This study shows that further research is needed to understand if 
this is replicated at the national level.  This could further demonstrate that well defined 
institutional structures provide greater benefit for conservation.  This study also confirms 
previous tested relationships regarding successful communal land management.  This 
study finds contradictory results to prior studies regarding community transparency, the 
frequency of communication, rule breakers punished, and rules being made by the 
community as promoted in prior literature. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
To promote conservation in communal lands in Cumbres de Monterrey National 
Park it is important to understand factors that facilitate or hinder sustainability (defined 
here as overgrazing and overharvesting), excludability (defined here as trust in members 
to follow the rules), and perceptions in conservation (defined here as adaptation of park 
promoted conservation practices).  Sustainability, excludability (Feeny et al., 1990), and 
perceptions in conservation (Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997; Raval, 1994; Kemf, 1993; West 
& Brechin, 1991; McNeely, 1990; MacKinnon & MacKinnon, 1986; Machlis & Tichnell 
1985) have all been determined to be essential for communal land management success 
and essential for the long term survival of protected areas.  While there are multiple 
communal land management studies, it was important that conditions that facilitate and 
hinder collective action were identified (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004).  Few studies of 
communal land management provide rigorous measures of independent variables that 
might affect sustainability and ecological success (Agrawal, 2002).   
Governance is an essential component of sustainability, excludability (Feeny et 
al., 1990), and conservation perceptions (Balint, 2006)  and governance factors vary by 
locality (Agrawal, 2001).  There are multiple studies have examined the conservation 
successes of ejido land in Mexico (Galletti, 1998; Porter-Bolland, 2012; Chowdhury, 
2010; Gerritsen, 1998); however, factors that contribute to these successes vary, and 
local institutional variables are often ignored.  Many case studies do vary and do not 
have broad applicability.  However, there are “three comprehensive attempts to produce 
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theoretically informed generalizations about the conditions under which groups of self-
organized users are successful in managing their common dilemmas,” and are used for 
this study (Agrawal, 2002).   These studies have been shown to be robust in a 
comparison with findings that a larger set of studies of the commons has identified 
(Agrawal, 2002).  Thus the indicators presented Baland & Platteau (1996), Wade (1988 
& 1994), and Ostrom (1990)  were used as proxy indicators for governance success.  The 
principles presented by each author differ and there is some overlap between the 
principles.  Please see principles in Appendix A.  It is important to note that both Ostrom 
(1990) and Baland & Platteau (1996) formed their variables based on a comprehensive 
and synthetic review of a large number of studies on the commons.  
While much has been written about communal land management success, 
questions remain on the best way to promote conservation for communities in national 
parks.  For example, how should stakeholders reduce overgrazing and overharvesting, 
and how do they improve rule compliance and excludability through increased trust in 
members to follow the established rules.  Attitudes towards community-based 
conservation are likely to differ among people of different demographic and socio-
economic class as they have differing needs and aspirations (Mehta & Kellert, 1998).  
Thus, these variables in Table 5, were explored in greater depth in this study to 
understand further how conservation and communal success can be promoted amongst 
communal lands (ejidos and comunidades) that reside inside or near Cumbres de 
Monterry National Park.  
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2.1 Park Conservation Perceptions by Inhabitants  
Research on the attitudes of local residents toward protected areas has been 
conducted in various countries (Selebatso et al., 2008; Bauer, 2003; Infield & Namara, 
2001; Ite, 1996; Natura, 1995).  External actors do not easily introduce conservation 
norms.  It is not generally known which strategies successfully alter the norms people 
hold about conservation, particularly when they are a part of the family income 
(Agrawal & Gibson, 1999).  There are different ways that the park promotes 
conservation; through trainings, rules, and compensation for labor.  Trainings are given 
in the park by multiple actors but the park conducts trainings particularly on wild fire 
prevention.  Rules in the park prevent users from cutting down live trees, collecting wild 
herbs, grazing outside of communal boundaries, having animals in the roadways, 
allowing animals to stay near streams or rivers, littering, and extracting soil or rocks.  
Compensation in the form of labor payment is given to a few people for planting trees, 
maintaining nurseries, and assisting with wildfires.  There is one community were a few 
members receive federal payment not affiliated with the park for not cutting down fir 
and spruce trees on their individual parcels. Although there are many ways that the park 
promotes conservation only compensation, trainings, boundary clarity, type of resource 
user, and communication frequency about natural resource management are factors that 
influence conservation perceptions.  Compensation can change conservation perceptions 
because negative attitudes are frequently associated with situations where the perceived 
costs to individuals and communities outweigh the perceived benefits (Frauman & 
Banks, 2011; Trakolis, 2001; Walpole & Goodwin, 2001).  Compensation can change 
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negative attitudes by making the benefits greater than the costs.  Attitudes have also been 
shown to be more positive toward conservation with an increase in income in Nepal 
(Mehta & Kellert,1998).  Use of economic incentives is usually more successful than 
authoritarian regulation when it comes to enlisting local support for conservation 
programs (Coria & Calfucura, 2012; Infield & Namara, 2001).  Conservation and 
monitoring of resources are difficult to achieve when boundaries are unclear (Wade, 
1988 & 1994; Ostrom, 1990).  Park conservation promotion attempts may have dismal 
results if boundaries are not clear.  Different resources users and income groups have 
different tendencies to support conservation measures (Mheta and Kellert,1998; Natura, 
1995).  It was questionable how people that rotate their livestock for grazing would 
accept conservation promotion.   
2.1.1 Independent Variables 
Compensation 
Compensation can change conservation perceptions because negative attitudes 
are frequently associated with situations where the perceived costs to individuals and 
communities outweigh the perceived benefits (Frauman & Banks, 2011; Trakolis, 2001; 
Walpole & Goodwin, 2001).  When Bruner et al. (2001) looked at 93 protected areas in 
22 countries they found that park effectiveness correlates with activities such as 
enforcement, boundary demarcation, and direct compensation to local communities.  
Pechac et al.(2013), in  a review of literature on protected areas in developing countries 
found verifying the impact of compensation on achievement difficult to prove.  
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Trainings 
Trainings are a common method for conservation promotion (Ebert, 2010; Pesek 
et al., 2010; Cramb, 2006; Long et al., 2003; Cramb and Culasero; 2003).  For 
conservation trainings to be more effective, there needs to be a clear understanding of 
the desired outputs, outcomes, and impacts amongst all parties which can sometimes be 
lacking in conservation training (Fien et al., 2001).  However, conservation project 
perceptions can still be unfavorable if trainings do not result in improvements in the 
communities expressed priority needs(Mehta & Kellert, 1998).   
Boundary Clarity 
Wade (1988 & 1994)  and Ostrom (1990) specified the importance boundary 
clarity for communal land management success.  The authors believed that clear 
boundaries are necessary to exclude users to prevent it from becoming an open access 
system.  Boundary clarity is also talked about in conservation literature; unclear 
boundaries are seen as a threat to conservation that can lead to conflict(Wunder et al, 
2008; Yasmi et al, 2007; Mugisha et al, 2004).  When boundaries are unclear and the 
resources in question have high economic value, land claims and conflicts intensify. 
Agreeing on a mutually accepted boundary becomes important (Wunder et al., 2008).  
Well defined boundaries reduce uncertainty about who will benefit and who will pay the 
costs.  Poorly defined boundaries increase uncertainty and impede efforts for a collective 
solution (Gibson et al., 2005; Dietz et al., 2003).  To understand this further Gibson et 
al. (2005) illustrates a possible scenario when boundaries are ill-defined.  When few 
resources are allocated to monitoring or enforcement, illegal harvesters are able to 
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harvest from boundaries when they are ill-defined.  If the illegal harvesters are caught, 
they can often offer a side payment to the monitor that is lower than the sanction. Poorly 
paid monitors have a difficult time refusing such offers.  The boundary clarity that is 
looked at in Cumbres de Monterrey is the boundary between legitimate and nonusers of 
the resource and not the boundary of the resource system (Dietz et al., 2003).     
Pasture Rotation 
Semi-nomadic and nomadic pastoralists are citied as having often times rich 
conservation knowledge (Stave et al., 2007; Goldman, 2003; Fernandez-Gimenez, 
2000).  When Stave et al. (2007) compared the ecological knowledge of semi-nomadic 
to sedentary pastoralists, they found that semi-nomadic pastoralists had greater 
conservation knowledge.  Pastoralist societies have developed adaptations for resilience 
over many generations.  Adaptations can vary and from management of reserve pastures, 
reciprocity among herders, and a diversity of movement patterns (Niamir-Fuller, 1998, 
p. 250-284).  Not all communal members in Cumbres de Monterrey National Park rotate 
their animals and those that do were considered a special group since they have 
potentially greater conservation knowledge.  Different resources users and income 
groups have different tendencies to support conservation measures (Mehta & Kellert, 
1998; Natura, 1995).   
Communication Frequency about Natural Resource Management with Communal 
Members 
  As members communicate more often, they transfer conservation knowledge to 
others.  Farmer field schools use a model of informal communication knowledge transfer 
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to try improve agricultural practices amongst small-scale farmers (Anandajayasekeram 
et al., 2007; Feder et al., 2004; Rola et al., 2002).  Communication frequency about 
natural resource management might promote conservation practices and was included in 
this study to inquire about this possible relationship further.  Increased communication 
frequency could influence how the park either promotes or discourages conservation 
practices by influencing trust and fairness perceptions, and knowledge transfer.   
2.2 Overgrazing and Overharvesting 
2.2.1 Overgrazing 
Mexico is one of the countries that is most severely affected by desertification 
(Campbell & Berry, 1997).  Desertification, resulting from over-cultivation and 
overgrazing is especially severe in the Northern Region of the country where rain-fed 
agriculture and livestock production are key economic drivers (Manzano et al., 2000).  
SEMERNAT (2003) listed the main causes of land degradation and their contributing 
percentages as; overgrazing (39%), agriculture (39%), deforestation (16%), and 
urbanization (3.5%).  Marginal lands are a characteristic of ejidos due to dry climate, 
poor soils, and severely degraded conditions (Ezcurra & Montaña, 1990; La Baurne and 
Dahl, 1986).   Marginal lands are increasingly susceptible to overgrazing.  Land 
degradation is linked to water shortages (Duda, 2003; Ripl, 2003).  Little is known about 
what institutional characteristics lead to overgrazing in ejidos and comunidades.  
Overgrazing in Mexican ejidos has been characterized as a result of property 
management deterioration (Wilson & Thompson, 1993).  According to the 2007 Ejido 
Census, 54.1% of the land in Mexico is covered by ejido or communidad tenure (INEGI, 
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2008).  It is essential to understand the institutional characteristics that can lead to 
overgrazing to prevent further land degradation and subsequent water shortages. In this 
section, I review some important factors that were identified in the literature as 
contributors to overgrazing. Because of their relevance, these factors also are 
incorporated in my survey questions and modeling effort to test their association with 
perceived overharvesting of natural resources in the study area. 
Government Assistance 
The understanding of the processes and linkages between poverty, land 
degradation, and growth is extremely limited and largely driven by perceptions of those 
undertaking the analysis. A lack of data and the complexity of the relationships limit a 
deeper understanding of each (Malik, 1998).  Households who do not practice 
sustainable systems will in the long term suffer increased poverty (Ellis-Jones, 1999). 
Overgrazing and land degradation is often associated with poverty, either because poor 
people live on marginal land (Dobie, 2001), and do to not allow land to have rest from 
grazing (Swinton et al., 2003; Reardon & Vosti, 1995), or cumulative effects of animal 
numbers amongst multiple owners in communal lands leads to overstocking (IFAD, 
2004).  Whether the poor or the non-poor are causing overstocking in communal lands is 
arguable.  Some studies credit the non-poor for having too many animals leading to 
overstocking (Swinton et al., 2003; Reardon & Vosti, 1995), or blame poverty to cause 
livestock owners in developing countries to hold on to livestock as a storage of wealth 
(Moll, 2005; Doran et al., 1979).  The poor are contributing to this problem specifically 
by not being able to invest in the environment, through fallow periods or rotational 
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grazing (Swinton et al., 2003; Reardon & Vosti, 1995).  The inability to invest in fallow 
periods or rotational grazing was of interest in the study presented here since this can 
further lead to overgrazing.  There is a clear relationship between poverty and 
overgrazing and it is important to understand this relationship to prevent further land 
degradation. 
Comunidad vs. Ejido 
While communal land management occurs with varied relationships to external 
government actors, internal governing structures could also influence behaviors and 
outcome of communal land management.  The research comparing the conservation 
outcomes between ejidos and comunidades in Mexico is limited.  Organizational 
structures affect the behavior of the institutions.  Staatz (1987) argues that the unique 
structural characteristics of agricultural cooperatives is what leads them to behave 
differently than investor owned firms.  Research comparing entire communal 
governance structures is limited, however research that compares aspects of these 
structures is more common.  Campbel and Shackleton (2001) review different 
community based management structures in Southern Africa and find that traditional 
leaders still have a say after institutional reforms and post-colonialism.  It was also found 
that some community based management systems work better when affiliated with local 
government and some worked better independently (Campbell & Shackelton, 2001).  
Greater participation in communities has been linked to adaptability and resilience 
(Robinson & Burkes, 2011).  Comunidades normally have greater participation than 
ejidos since there is not necessarily a limit to one representative per family like ejidos.   
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Government Punishment 
Government sanctions are one of the fundamental aspects of successful 
communal land management according to the seminal works of this field (Wade, 1998 & 
1994; Ostrom, 1990).  Local enforcement is not always successful although often 
promoted.  At times external enforcement is needed (Ostrom, 2000).  A system of 
external checks and balances is seen as having better sustained outcomes (Agrawal and 
Gibson, 1999).  Checks and balance can be limited when external government enforcers 
do not always travel to remote areas (Ostrom, 1994).  When comparing communal 
institutions across Southern Africa Campbell & Shackelton (2001) found that some 
community based management systems worked better when affiliated with local 
government and some worked better independently for sustainable outcomes.  In a study 
in southern Mexico of an ejido in another National Park, external government 
monitoring and sanctioning was complimentary since the community did not have 
personnel or funding to monitor however it also complicated their monitoring process 
(Johnson & Nelson, 2004).   
Park Promoted Conservation Practices  
It is hardly known which strategies successfully alter the norms people hold 
about conservation, particularly when they are a part of the family income (Campbell & 
Berry, 1997). Negative attitudes are frequently associated with situations where the 
perceived costs to individuals and communities outweigh the perceived benefits 
(Frauman & Banks, 2011, Walpole & Goodwin, 2001; Lindberg et al., 1996). The 
distribution of the costs and the benefits may also affect attitudes, particularly if the 
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recipient perceives if he or she has not received a fair share.  Tourism benefits, such as 
jobs, can have a greater effect than productive or aesthetic benefits because tourism is 
more apparent.  Attitudes may also depend on the willingness of residents to accept 
governmental policy and the level of participation in protected area decision making by 
residents (Lindberg et al., 1996).  If there is a negative relationship between park 
promoted conservation and overgrazing, then park promoted conservation is promoting 
pasture conservation.  If the relationship is positive, then the park does not successfully 
promote pasture conservation on the communal lands.   
Hectares Permitted for Grazing 
Small size, as a defining characteristic of a community, has been implicit in the 
literature since the beginning of the writings on communal land management (Agrawal 
and Gibson, 1999).  Small groups have been cited for poor management of resources 
whereas large transitional groups have been cited to manage resources more efficiently 
(Agrawal, 1999).  In Tigray, Ethiopia communal land that had smaller restricted grazing 
lands per household reported fewer violations, established penalty systems, and paid for 
a guard (Gebremedhin, 2004).  Wilson & Thompson (1993) state that large grazing areas 
in semi-arid and arid ejidos in the North of Mexico are needed to provide resource 
mobility.  Smaller grazing areas with high stocking densities in arid and semi-arid lands 
can cause famers to miss the rain and lead to failure (Wilson & Thompson, 1993).  
These previous studies clearly suggest that the size of permitted grazing areas has a 
potential impact on overgrazing.  
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2.2.2 Overharvesting 
 Overharvesting refers to the overuse of any natural resource other than pasture.  
SEMERNAT (2003) listed the main causes of land degradation in Mexico and their 
contributing percentages as; agriculture (39%), overgrazing (39%), deforestation (16%), 
and urbanization (3.5%).  Half of Mexico (54.1%) has lands that are in ejido or 
communal  tenure (INEGI, 2008). The majority of the remaining forests in Mexico 
(80%) reside in 8,000 ejidos and comunidades (Klooster, 2000).  It is illegal to fell trees 
in communal areas without a government approved permit.  Forest owning communities 
lost many of their rights to their forests during the four decades after world war two 
when the government gave monoposonistic rights to integrated logging and processing 
industries.  Communities could no longer clear, cut, or burn forested lands but they could 
sell their rights for minimal stumpage fees to industry.  After strikes to sign wood 
contracts and immense pressure from logging communities a Forestry Law was passed 
in 1986 that allowed communities to form their own logging business with government 
approval.  Trees in communal areas can only be felled with permits from the 
government.  Enforcement is stronger for pine and officials tend to look the other way 
when less than a truck load is felled for oak particularly for subsistence usage (Klooster, 
2000).  Ejidos are not always successful in preventing deforestation or overharvesting 
(Honey-Rosés, 2009).  
It is important to understand what institutional characteristics can lead to 
overharvesting in communal lands in the park for water conservation and preservation of 
rare species in Mexico.  In this section, I review some important factors that were 
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identified in the literature as contributors to overharvesting of natural resources. Because 
of their relevance, these factors are also incorporated in my survey questions and 
modeling to test their association with perceived overharvesting of natural resources in 
the study area. 
Comunidad vs. Ejido 
Ejidos and comunidades have been shown to have higher conservation habitat 
than private lands (Ortega-Huerta & Kral, 2007).  Ejidos have been cited to promote 
conservation by preserving forests (Ortega-Huerta & Kral, 2007; Ellis & Porter-
Bolland., 2008), birds, and mammal species (Ortega-Huerta & Kral, 2007).  Ellis & 
Porter-Bolland (2008) compared two biosphere reserves in the Yucatan peninsula with 
ejidos  and found that the biosphere reserve that had a long standing community forestry 
operation and long term planning for lands in the area had a negative deforestation rate 
from 2000-2005 and the other biosphere reserve had a deforestation rate of 0.7%.  When 
comparing 11 protected Maya forests in Mexico and Guatemala with 19 community 
forests, Bray et al. (2008) found that deforestation rates were higher in protected areas 
than in community forests.  The difference was not significant.  There was also no 
significant difference in the deforestation in inhabited protected areas, recently inhabited 
community forests, in uninhabited protected areas, and uninhabited community forests.  
Under low colonization pressure, extractive communities that have been inhabited for a 
long time perform as well as strict uninhabited protected areas.  This research shows that 
communal forests under low population pressure can be more economical and effective 
for conservation.  Ortega-Huerta & Kral (2007) looked at the average percentage of 
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natural vegetation aggregation index, and the Shannon biodiversity index for different 
tenure arrangements in the gulf, plains, and mountainous regions in Mexico.  When 
looking at the mountainous regions, private property has a biodiversity index of 1.87, 
ejidos 1.96, and comunidades 2.05.  Thus, there was only a slight difference in the 
diversity index between the tenure types with communal land performing better.  The 
aggregation indexes were high with private property at 87%, ejidos 89%, and 
comunidades at 93%.  However the percentage of natural vegetation  was quite low, with 
comunidades at 30% natural vegetation, ejidos 20%, and private property at 21%.  
Comunidades in mountainous regions performed better than ejidos  and  private property 
on all three indexes.  Thus, it is questionable whether comunidades are more susceptible 
to overharvesting than ejidos.  
Microfinance 
Investment poverty is a concept that has been coined to signify the limited 
investment in natural resources that can further lead to degradation and subsequent 
poverty (Swinton et al., 2003; Reardon & Vosti, 1995).  Microfinance groups are a 
common strategy for development and poverty alleviation in developing countries.  The 
question remains, however, how users will choose to use these funds.  Microcredit is 
often used to buy pesticides, fertilizers, cattle, and land for activities that can have a 
negative impact on conservation.  Microcredit can also be used for micro drip irrigation, 
self-help groups, agroforestry, and sustainable agriculture, for improved watershed 
management (Lal & Israel, 2006).  In a reserved watershed in China, microfinance was 
used to enable those dependent on the resource to branch out into other businesses and to 
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reduce their dependence on natural resources, however it did not work (Herrold-
Menzies, 2008).  In Indonesia, microfinance was given to small fishermen to reduce 
fishing pressures and preserve coral reefs; while microfinance increased and diversified 
their incomes, it did not relieve fishing pressures (Brock, 2013).  Jetti (2011), argues that 
microfinance is linked to the commons since, “a majority of the loan recipients of 
microfinance loans in the developing world make at least a part of their living by 
utilizing common pool resources (CPR) such as forests, fisheries, agricultural lands, 
mineral resources, waterways and the like.”  Research in this area has proven to be 
difficult, as many micro lenders do not keep documentation of what the loan was used 
for (Goldsworthy, 2010).  Given the possible linkages between microfinance and 
degradation and the lack of quantifiable evidence, the presence of microfinance was 
included in the survey questions.   
Presence of Other Organized Groups 
Increased human organization can serve as a safeguard for conservation 
(Campbell & Berry, 1997).  Brechin et al. (2002) expected to find that increased 
organizational capacity would be in line with the elements of the social and political 
process and would increase self-enforcement and reduce the need for forced compliance.  
Group formation has also been cited to increase connectedness; more levels of 
connectedness can lead to better outcomes.  These connections can occur in different 
forms; local connections between individuals, local connections between groups, local 
group and external group connections (either one or two way relationships), external-
external connections (leading to integrated approaches and collaborative partnerships), 
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and external individual connections (Pretty & Ward, 2001).  These and implied 
connections to other groups in society from the macro and micro level improve 
outcomes (Uphoff, 1993; Grootaer, 1998; Woolcock, 1998).  When Uphoff conducted a 
comparative study of 16 countries in Asia, the countries which had the best linkages 
between central government and rural communities through a network of local 
institutions had the best performance in agriculture and social indicators.  Impressive 
differences were also found for nutrition, health, and education improvements (Uphoff, 
1993).   Groater (1998) found that associations and institutions provide and informal 
framework to organize information sharing, coordinating of activities, and collective 
decision making that can improve outcomes when not taken over by local overlords.  
Woolcock (1998) found that groups can have either the positive or negative aspects of 
social capital that can promote or halt development.  To understand if local groups and 
social capital is increasing or decreasing overharvesting the presence of other groups 
was included in the survey. 
Pasture Fencing and Natural Boundaries 
In a study in South Africa fences were not only to keep out animals but also 
wood gatherers and hunters.  The absence of fencing and grazing pressure led to 
denuded vegetation and topsoil, erosion in steeper slopes, and the spread of invasive and 
unpalatable species (Ainslie, 1999). In another study in South Africa, fencing and the 
absence of boys to herd livestock was stated to have led to degradation in rangelands 
(Fabricius, 2004).  Fencing in Inner Mongolia has led to erosion (Williams, 1996).  Todd 
& Hoffman (1999) observed the plant distribution around a fence that divided heavily 
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grazed communal lands and lightly grazed commercial lands in Namaqualand, South 
Africa.  They did not find a significant difference in plant species richness. However, the 
richness in large palatable shrubs had decreased on the communal land (Todd & 
Hoffman., 1999).  The literature often cites the need for fences, and, on the other hand, it 
also cites how fences lead to degradation.  This factor is interlinked with the number of 
animals on the land.   
Number of Parcels Sold to External Buyers 
Several studies document the sale of ejidos corresponding to changes in land 
cover.  Lambin et al. (2001) stated that changes in land cover result from “... peoples 
responses to economic opportunities, as mediated by institutional factors ...”   In coastal 
ejidos in Senora, coastal wetlands have been sold and transformed into commercial 
shrimping farms (Luers et al., 2006).  In the Yaqui Valley, a major wheat producing area 
of Mexico, 95% of Ejidos have been sold or rented out and there has been a 
corresponding increase in the intensification of wheat cultivation (Matson, 2012).  Ejidos 
are often sold legally or illegally when located near urban areas (Ojeda-Revah, 2008). 
Since ejidos and comunidades have been shown to have higher conservation habitat than 
private lands (Ortega-Huerta & Kral, 2007)
 
, it is questionable how there change in 
ownership might affect conservation.  
2.3 Perceptions in Following the Rules 
Trust in others to follow the rules can increase cooperation from a resulting sense 
of social obligation (Pretty & Ward, 2001), and can reduce transaction costs for rule 
enforcement.  Trust takes time to build and is easily broken (Gambetta, 1988; 
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Fukuyama, 2008).  When distrust infiltrates a society, cooperative arrangements are 
unlikely to emerge (Baland & Platteau, 1996).  Trust, reciprocal arrangements, locally 
developed rules, norms and sanctions, and emergent institutions have been clearly shown 
to deliver biodiversity dividends in many contexts.  Thus, it is important to blend both 
biological and social elements for conservation (Pretty & Smith, 2004).  Trust in 
members to follow the rules may be influenced by factors such as community 
transparency, hectares permitted for grazing, communication frequency about natural 
resource management, rules made by the community, and if rule breakers are punished.  
2.3.1 Independent Variables 
Community Transparency 
Transparency is as a tool to fight off corruption.  Corruption is the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain. Mexico received a score of 34 (out of 100) in the 
corruption perception index in 2013 (Transparency International, 2013).  Transparency 
was included in this study not only because it is an essential component of governance 
but also due to its reference in literature as an essential component of communal land 
management (Child, 1996; Blaikie, 2006; Nelson & Agrawal, 2008).  Good governance 
is important for improved conservation outcomes. Transparency is a measurement of 
good governance that is frequently used amongst the World Bank and in international 
development projects (Balint, 2006).  When leaders are transparent, it improves trust 
among their followers (Norman et al., 2010).  Organizational transparency has also been 
shown to lead to greater levels of trust (Rawlins, 2006).  However, Grimmelikhuijsen 
(2012) found that transparency could lead to lower levels of trust if people are 
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disappointed with the low degree to which the government is transparent.   
Hectares Permitted for Grazing 
Baland & Platteau (1996) and Wade (1988 & 1994) 
 
referred to small land size as 
an indicator for success for communal land management.  The size of a community and 
its resource base have been written about since the beginning of the writings in this field
 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999).  However, size alone is not a determinant of success.  
Other factors must be taken into account when looking at size.  Several authors have 
indicated that in smaller areas users can communicate more frequently, thus lowering the 
transactional cost of rule enforcement (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Wade, 1988 & 1994;
 
Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). Communal grazing areas vary in nature; some are covered 
by forests (tree felling in communal areas without a permit is illegal), have streams, 
shrubs, and medicinal herbs.  Regardless of cover, the designated communal area in 
comunidades and ejidos is generally used for grazing.  Larger resource bases can often 
be more costly to monitor and could lead to reduced trust in following the rules.  To 
understand the relationship between resource size, monitoring, and trust the number of 
hectares permitted for grazing was included in the survey questions.  
Communication Frequency about Natural Resource Management 
Communication frequency around natural resource management can have a 
possible influence on trustworthiness of members to follow the rules. In a study 
conducted amongst trustee’s and trustors, the level of perceived trustworthiness was 
found to be affected by the frequency of communication (Becerra & Gupta, 2003).   In 
another study examining the complex relationships between superiors and subordinates, 
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fairness perceptions were found to often be constructed by workgroup members through 
discourse (Sias & Jablin, 1995).  When there is conflict in communal management, 
communication is promoted to understand each other needs, drain frustration, and 
transform negative stereotypes.  Through interactive conflict management, 
communication can build trust (Upreti, 2002).  In the communal land management 
literature many authors refer to small size as important, when they are referring to the 
reduced transactional costs for rule enforcement (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999).  
Rules Community Made 
Wade (1988 & 1994)
 
and Ostrom (1990) talk about the importance of rules being 
locally devised and having access to and management of the rules.  Locally developed 
rules along with trust and norms and sanctions have shown to deliver biodiversity 
dividends in many contexts (Pretty & Smith, 2004). When users are genuinely engaged 
in decisions regarding rules affecting their resource use, the likelihood that they will 
follow the rules and monitor others is much greater than when an authority simply 
imposes rules (Ostrom & Nagendra, 2006).  Much of the literature supports local rule 
creation since there is the ability to modify rules when needed and negotiate claims 
(Cleaver, 2007).  Studies have observed inequitable relationships of resource utilization 
by poorer users when the rules are externally made (Leach, 1999). It was apparent that 
communities in the park had different levels of external involvement.  To understand 
how this external involvement affects rules, a question regarding local rulemaking was 
included in the survey.    
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Rule Breakers Punished 
 Government sanctions are part of the signature work of Wade (1988 & 1994) and 
Ostrom (1990).  Baland & Platteau (1996) refer to rule punishment as the ease in 
enforcement of rules.  As mentioned previously, Pretty & Smith (2004) found norms and 
sanctions to deliver biodiversity dividends in many contexts. In an experimental social 
dilemma, when groups are competing for members, groups who do not adopt a 
sanctioning system find their joint earnings dissipating and groups who adopt a 
sanctioning system obtain higher outcomes and draw new members from other groups 
(Gurek et al., 2006).  Vollan (2008) found that penalties work best in a low trust region 
and crowds-out co-operation in a high trust region. Rewards work well in a high trust 
region and they do not work well in a low trust region.  It was also found that a society 
with a cultural tradition of strong norms on trust and reciprocity can be negatively 
influenced by restrictive external interventions.  If the community is one where people 
do not initially trust each other, the external penalty rule is likely to perform well.  How 
punishment affects members trust in others to follow the rules needs further exploration.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
3.1 Study Area 
Mexican ejidos and comunidades, two communal management systems, were 
considered in this study.  The Mexican federal office Reforma Agraria provided the 
locations of seven comunidades that were located in close proximity to each other, so 
that they were ecologically similar.  These seven comunidades were located inside or 
had part of their boundary in the National Park “Cumbres de Monterrey”.  There were 
also thirteen ejidos in the area, five of which were located completely inside the park and 
eight were located partially inside the park.  Given their close proximity and similar 
ecosystems, these comunidades and ejidos were subject to many similar external social, 
physical, and institutional forces, reducing the number of variables that had to be 
considered in order to measure their potentially different impacts.  However, for this 
study some ejidos were not included for the following reasons: they were sold in their 
entirety, all the members had left and fled to the city, or they were inaccessible by car.  
For this study, seven comunidades were surveyed of which two were partially outside of 
the park, and seven ejidos were surveyed of which two were also partially outside of the 
park.  One of these comunidades/ejidos had the same name and has been split into two 
different management regimes. Hence, they were separated in this count since they 
function as separate entities.  Refer to appendix B for a map of the park as well as the 
community boundaries. 
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The formation of the ejido emerged out of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1915.  
The ejido is a well-defined system of common property rights that was used by the 
Aztecs at the time of the Spanish conquest.  The calpulli is a group or community of 
individuals (usually with family or lineage ties), which controlled a set area of land and 
managed under individual usufruct (Sanderson, 1984).  Spanish and Mexican rule 
eliminated this system by making land grants and land concessions to elites.  These 
concessions steadily increased because of Mexico’s growing agricultural demands, 
reaching their peak in the Porfiriato period between 1876 and 1910.  In fact, by 1910, 
one-half of the Mexican rural population were indebted agricultural laborers in 
haciendas.  Haciendas are closely-knit feudal estates that were created by the Spaniards 
(Chevalier, 1963).   Agrarian reform was one of the major driving forces behind the 
Mexican Revolution of 1910-1915.  The first Agrarian Reform act of 1915 stipulated the 
common property system of the ejidos and gave the government the power of 
expropriation or eminent domain of all lands.  Individuals living on abandoned 
haciendas were granted the land by regulations established in 1922.  Land re-
appropriation went through cycles stimulated by pressure from landless rural people, 
with peak re-appropriation in 1930, a nadir in the 40s and 50s, and then another peak in 
the 60s and 70s (Wilson & Thompson, 1993).   
However, prior to the 1990s Mexico was a net importer of food. Thus, in 1992 
article 27 of the Mexican constitution was amended, allowing for the sale of individual 
parcels (solares) and individual agricultural plots (parcelas) in ejidos.  With community 
agreement, members are also permitted to sell communal grazing areas.  Upon the death 
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of the ejido member, the rights are passed on to only one family member.  The highest 
power in the ejido is the asamblea (assembly) that is comprised of all ejiditarios. 
Decisions are made by majority vote.  The asamblea ideally should meet once a month 
or at the greatest frequency possible.  All finances and decisions are to be made 
transparent to the asamblea in the meetings. The next highest power is the comisariado 
(president) who has to live and work inside the ejido six months prior to election and has 
to work in the ejido during his term in office.  Next is the consejo de vigilancia who also 
is elected to power and who has the responsibility of monitoring resource use and the 
compliance of community members with community rules.  
Comunidades agrarias, on the other hand, are a different form of communal land 
management in which members are allowed to determine the divisions of the community 
and the organizational structure.  Communal rights generally pertain to every family 
member in the community and can be determined by the community (Ley Agraria 
Articulo 100, 1992).  Thus, the size of a comunidad can continue growing as rights are 
not passed on to one family member like an ejido,  Since they are more flexible in 
structure they do not always have a designated communal grazing area and individual 
parcels.  If they do, they are not always held on record by the department of agrarian 
reform like ejidos.  Property rights are more loosely defined in comunidades than in 
ejidos.  Comunidades agrarias were created by the government in general for indigenous 
communities (Procuraría Agraria, 2006).  Comunidades are allowed to adopt the 
organizational regime of an ejido if they so desire and thus are able to sell land if 
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registered as an ejido (Ley Agraria Articulo 98, 1992).   A few communities in this study 
have applied and have been waiting to receive ejido status.   
Ejidos control approximately 40% of agricultural lands in México.  On average, 
ejidos are 30-50% less agriculturally productive than private lands.  Thus, many see 
privatization as an opportunity for increased agricultural productivity (Wilson & 
Thompson, 1993).  However, Wilson & Thompson (1993) argue that “agricultural 
production in semiarid and arid zones requires resource mobility, particularly the 
freedom to graze livestock throughout a large, extensive land area.”  Common grazing 
lands therefore represent a hedge or insurance against uncertainty in rainfall patterns.  
They also conclude that “…the breakdown in ejido productivity on these extensive, 
livestock-herding areas is due to the deterioration in property management at the 
community level.”  They hypothesize that ejidos can behave like open access systems 
when leaders are unable to enforce rules.  Coronado-Quintana et al. (2001) have shown 
that ejidos can be just as productive as private lands, and are more affected by their 
infrastructure (road and well access) than by  their organizational structure (private vs. 
ejido/communal) (Coronado-Quintana et al., 2001).  The lack of infrastructure 
development and consequent decreased productivity could be a strong reason why ejidos  
and comunidades are shown to have higher habitat conservation than private lands 
(Ortega-Huerta & Kral, 2007).  However, as of yet, no one has looked at how the 
organizational structure and strength may affect overgrazing and overharvesting of 
natural resources.    
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Cumbres de Monterrey National Park is located in the northeast of the Sierra 
Madre Oriental geological province.  The Sierra Madre Oriental geological region 
extends on the north to Big Bend National Park in Texas and to the south to the Southern 
Volcanic Belt in Mexico (López-Ramos, 1979).  In this part of the geological province, 
many mountain peaks reach approximately 3,400 meters above sea level (SEMERNAT, 
2009).  The Sierra Madre Oriental mountain range is composed of sedimentary rock that 
varies in age from the tertiary period (ITESM, 1994). The park is located in the Rio 
Bravo - Conchos hydrological region inside the Rio Bravo- San Juan watersheds.  
Tributaries and water drain into the Rio Bravo, San Juan, and Pesquería rivers.  The 
principal river in the park is the Santa Catarina that collects about eighty percent of the 
hydrologic resources of the region. The Rio San Juan watershed supplies the majority of 
the surrounding urban areas with water. Inside the park, there are many factures, faults, 
and permeable geologic structures that make this area a watershed recharge zone.  The 
climate in the park is defined by the corresponding physiographic locality.  In the highest 
areas of the park temperatures oscillate between -3°C y 18° C, Celcius in the winter 
months of November through January (CONABIO, 2008).  Lowland areas of the park at 
400 meters above sea level will reach maximum temperatures of 32°C while the highest 
parts of the park will reach 26°C and 27°C in the months of June and July 
(SEMERNAT, 2009).   
Dry winds come in from the west and create a dryer climate in the northwestern 
part of the park where the landscape is characterized by many dry land plants.  In the 
highest elevations of the park where the slope permits tree growth, intact fir and spruce 
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forests can be found.  In the lower parts of the park near rivers, sedentary agriculture is 
found.  Throughout the park pine and oak forests are found.  A sub-mountain shrub 
ecotone is found throughout the park on hillsides and indicates a forest transition.  
According to the Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography the majority of 
the park falls into this classification and is found principally in the northern part of the 
park where there are steep slopes and strong winds (INEGI, 2005).  The height of its 
cover varies from 2.5 to 5 meters.  In areas with tree cover, Helietta parvifolia  and 
Acacia berlandieri are found.  In areas with shrub cover Leucophyllum frutescens and 
Acacia ridigula can be found. On a smaller scale Agave lechuguilla  and Euphorbia 
antisyphilitica  are found throughout both.  The tree species that are found throughout 
the park are principally Pinus pseudostrobus, Abies vejari, and Picea martinezi.  Other 
species that are also found throughout are Quercus polymorpha, Q. rysophylla, Q. 
graciliformis, Q. laeta, Q. mexicana, Q. rugosa, and Q. laceyi (SEMERNAT, 2009).   
The park has federally protected forests with fir and spruce species that are not 
common in Mexico.  A lumber mill used to exist in an ejido where the protected fir and 
spruce forests are located.  Felling live trees in the park is not legal and many 
respondents mentioned having permit requests for felling denied.  As mentioned prior, 
the park is located on a water recharge zone that provides 70% of the water for the city 
of Monterrey (CONANP, 2013) and land degradation is linked to water shortages (Duda, 
2003; Ripl, 2003).  The central plateau, to the west of the park, is the most severely 
affected area in Mexico from desertification (Manzano et al., 2000).  Appendix D has a 
map of the land degradation in Mexico created by SEMERNAT (2004). 
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3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Key Concepts, Variables, and Measurements 
The key concepts of this research were perceptions of park promoted 
conservation, overharvesting natural resources, overgrazing, and trust in members to 
follow rules.  These variables were measured using household surveys with face-to-face 
interviews.  The survey can be found in Appendix C. Park promoted conservation was at 
the end of the survey due to the controversial nature of the subject from often-tense park 
relationships.  The question was stated as; “How has the park affected your natural 
resource management practices?”  The available answers were: toward more 
conservation, no impact, toward less conservation.  To measure overgrazing the 
following question was asked, “Do you think that pasture is overstocked with animals or 
overgrazed by community members?”  This was a binary question with a yes or no 
response. The question to measure overharvesting states, “Do you think that other 
resources are overharvested or that the demand is too high?”  This was also a binary yes 
or no question with an open-ended follow up on what types of resources the respondent 
mentions.  Few people chose to answer the follow up question, many simply stated 
“natural resources” and the question was left blank.  The usage of wood in the park was 
a contentious issue.  Surveyors constantly assured respondents that they were not 
associated with the park or the government so that respondents would be willing to take 
the survey.  The question regarding trust to follow the rules was also placed on the last 
page since it is a sensitive question.  The question states: “How well do you trust 
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community members to follow the established rules?”  The response options are: never, 
sometimes, usually, and always.   
These key concepts serve as dependent variables in this study.  Institutional 
success was defined as the level of trust in members to follow the established rules. The 
responses “usually” and “always” were considered as institutional success whereas  
“never” and “sometimes” were defined as institutional failure.   Baland & Platteau 
(1996), Wade (1988 & 1994)
 
and Ostrom (1990) talked about the ease in the 
enforcement of the rules, but did not directly state that trust in members following the 
rules was necessary for successful communal land management.  Thus, this new concept 
was tested as part of the present study.  Sustainable management was defined as the 
absence of overharvesting and overgrazing.  Park promoted conservation refers to how 
the establishment of the park has affected respondents natural resource management 
practices.  Positive park relations are important to reduce conflict and ideally to reduce 
rule breaking.  These key concepts were used as dependent variables in my models.   
Important independent variables were also measured to test their relationship 
with the key dependent variables.  The main independent variables were also measured 
include: natural resource collaboration, compensation for conservation, respect from 
external government actors, transparency, and influence on community decision making.  
Baland & Platteau (1996)
 
and Wade (1998 & 1994), stated that interdependence among 
group members is an important group characteristic for communal management success.  
However, this concept was difficult to measure.  Here, the concept was evolved into 
collaboration and specifically asked as the frequency in which members talk to each 
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other about natural resource management.  The frequencies listed for selection were: 
every few months, monthly, weekly, and daily.  Another measurement used to asses 
collaboration was whether or not the community practiced rotational grazing since 
practicing rotational grazing takes greater community collaboration than operating 
individually.  Since individual parcels were small, this means that animals were being 
either rotated between individual plots or that the communal area had been subdivided 
and animals were being rotated.   
Appropriate levels of external aid are needed to compensate local users (Baland 
& Platteau, 1996).  This study did not look at the appropriate levels since compensation 
is not a common practice in the study area and happens only in a few select 
communities.  Compensation is given when communities had federally protected spruce 
and fir forests, when select members were asked to help stop forest fires, plant trees, or 
maintain emergencies. Only one community stated that some members had parcels in the 
federally protected forests with spruce and fir who were eligible for federal 
compensation.  The majority of compensation was given as payment for work rather 
than payment for behavioral adaptation of current resource practices.  Rather, the 
presence of compensation was observed to see the effect it had on users and their 
perception of park promoted conservation.  Many authors have discussed the importance 
of conservation compensation for park inhabitants over authoritarian regulation (Coria & 
Calfucura, 2012; Infield & Namara, 2001).  Two forms of compensation were explored 
here in this study: whether or not respondents have received compensation for 
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conservation activities, and the number of external trainings respondents have received 
in a year.   
Wade (1998 & 1994) and Ostrom (1990) reported that to achieve communal land 
management success central governments should not undermine local authorities.  
Baland and Platteau
 
(1996)  stated that there should be supportive external sanctioning 
institutions.  This was measured by two questions.  The first was; “Do other 
governmental authorities respect the decisions of local authorities?” and the second was; 
“Do other governmental authorities and institutions support local punishments for rule 
breakers?”.  This was measured with a binary yes or no response.  Note that this 
measured external support of punishments and the decisions of local authorities 
specifically.   
Baland & Platteau (1996) mentioned the importance of accountability of 
monitors and other officials to users.  Here this was measured as transparency.  The 
question states “Is the community managed in a transparent way?”  The response options 
were: never, sometimes, usually, and always.  This was measured because corruption is a 
huge problem in Mexico.  Mexico received a rank of 106 of 177 countries in 2013 by 
transparency international (Transparency International, 2013).   
Baland & Platteau (1996), Wade (1988 & 1994), and Ostrom (1990) each 
mention the importance of locally devised access and management of rules.  To 
incorporate this concept and to further test corruption, the questions was stated as “Is 
your opinion influential in the community decision making process?”  The options were: 
never, sometimes, usually, and always.  It was evident from the experience on the 
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ground that responses to this question varied from community to community.  There 
were several other variables that were measured as well regarding this topic such as the 
number of years the leader has been in his position, if there was a term limit, if rules 
were just, and how often community members meet. 
3.2.2  Survey Questionnaire  
Introduction 
Face-to-face surveys were conducted to solicit the data needed for this study.  
The survey questionnaire (Appendix B) was comprised of sixty-three questions that 
assessed the indicators for measuring institutional and ecological success along with the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents and other variables.   This has been 
explained in the key concepts, variables and measurements section above.  The survey 
questionnaire was pretested with university students.  A reliability analysis was 
conducted on the pretest survey results as a measure of internal consistency using SPSS 
(IBM Corp, 2012).  Questions with a Cronbach’s α greater than 0.7 were modified.  
Survey questions were generated using the Dillman (2007) text as guidance. 
Collection 
Surveys were conducted during daylight hours ranging from 7am to 6pm in the 
month of January 2010.  Many of the community members went to the city to work as 
temporary laborers during the winter.  Due to travel time in some communities, surveys 
occurred before and after lunch time.   It was not safe to drive at night since roads go 
through steep mountain terrain with limited lighting; water froze in some parts of the 
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park at night.  Escalating violence and insecurity did now allow for follow up surveys.  
Agricultural Production 
Respondents were livestock owners, mainly owning; donkeys, horses, cows, and 
goats.  Communities in the central region of the park often grew apples or other stone 
fruit trees due to the cooler temperatures available at higher elevations.  Preserves were 
sold on the main roads near tourist points.  Communities on the south east border of the 
park grew pecans and had higher quality housing in general.  The community of La 
Trinidad on the eastern part of the park, at a very high elevation, grew fir trees, and had 
protected forests from the UN and the government.  There used to be a timber mill 
located there, as there was a very dense conifer forest.  The mill was closed due to 
felling restrictions, which resulted in unemployment.   
Survey Format 
The questions were ordered by theme predominantly.  Questions that were more 
sensitive were put later in the list of questions.  The survey started out by asking if 
respondents were part of an ejido or communidad.  If respondents stated no, then the 
survey was terminated.  If respondents were part of an ejido or comunidad, they were 
then asked if they grazed animals in the communal area.  If respondents did not own 
animals or had not owned animals that utilized the communal grazing area, the survey 
was terminated.  For respondents who had livestock, the survey then went into general 
livestock and pasture management questions.  After this, the questions revolved around 
the presence of different types of groups in the community.  At this point the survey 
transitioned into institutional questions regarding meeting frequency and attendance, 
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opinion influence, leader experience, transparency, rules that were just, the participation 
of women in rule making, term limits, and term years.  The respondents were then asked 
questions revolving around economics; how much members helped each other, access to 
microfinance, annual livestock earnings, and the number of adults and children in the 
family.  The survey then returned to natural resource restrictions since a general 
relationship and comfort level would be established at this point.  Questions relating to 
natural resource restrictions were: the presence of natural resource restrictions, if 
restrictions helped regeneration, pasture fencing and natural boundaries, pasture rotation, 
community infrastructure, and animal types.  Questions regarding the relationship with 
external government actors were then asked regarding respect, punishment, conservation 
compensation, participation in federal assistance programs, and the number of years of 
school attended.  The respondents were then asked about the presence of overharvesting 
and overgrazing and several questions regarding rules and restrictions.  Questions about 
rules were separated into different sections to assure that respondents did not answer the 
same to all questions regarding rules, particularly since it is a tense and complicated 
subject. The survey ends with questions regarding the number of properties sold, if 
respondents thought there community was better than other communities, the 
respondents perception on park promoted conservation, how the park has affected their 
wellbeing, the number of trainings received, and how household decisions were made.  
3.2.3 Sampling Methods and Sample Size 
The sampling methods used here was multistage sampling since there was not an 
adequate list of individuals in the study population (Fowler, 2009).  Maps provided from 
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the Department of Agrarian Reform helped us navigate the location of the communities.  
Some communities had dirt roads on steep terrain that varied in condition due to weather 
and some communities did not have roads making their access impossible. Upon arrival, 
the number of households present was assessed along with the proportion to the total 
population.  Surveys were attempted at all households because many people were absent 
due to migratory labor.  In Laguna de Sanchez a small human settlement was not 
surveyed since there were not any roads leading there and we did not have a guide to 
help us access the small human settlement.  Other small human settlements in the 
mountains of Laguna de Sanchez were sampled.  There are more survey responses from 
this community than any other due to the fact that it had the largest population and 
human settlement in the park.  Due to the large representation of samples for Laguna de 
Sanchez and the inclusion of many communities that were difficult to access, the chance 
for bias from the exclusion of this one human settlement is low.  
In some communities people showed resistance towards surveyors and thus 
snowball sampling had to be used.  This method used the approach where the first 
respondent identifies people the surveyor should talk to next (Trochim & Donnelly, 
2007).  This occurred in La Cieneguilla and in half of the surveys in Paso de Guadalupe 
y Mariposa .  However, it needs to be noted that surveys were attempted in all houses for 
both methods.  These were the only communities in which people would not talk to us.  
Five households in Paso de Guadalupe y Mariposa would not talk to us, and 10 
househeolds in La Cieneguilla would not talk to us.  In communities in the park with 
higher tourism and access to major roads and population centers, there was a strong 
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belief that the National Park Service would like to get rid of all farm animals.  Due to the 
fact that members in this community believed that researchers were affiliated with the 
Park Service, snowball sampling initially had to be used there.  In an effort to gain more 
survey participants in La Cieneguilla and parts of Laguna de Sanchez, participants were 
asked if they previously had animals in the communal area rather than currently, so that 
respondents would be more willing to talk to us.  Apparently, having animals in La 
Cieneguilla was a controversial issue.  It was located near an urban area in the main 
entrance to the park that received many tourists.  The community owned a waterfall that 
tourists would pay to view.  In general, park respondents were afraid that the park would 
take away their animals since there have been complaints by tourists about livestock in 
the road or near streams.  This community was particularly more sensitive to this issue 
than others.    
Community members who lived permanently outside of the community yearlong 
were excluded from this study because of their inaccessibility.  In many of the 
communities, a sub-population lived outside of the community year round in 
surrounding urban areas (Monterrey/Saltillo/Villa de Santiago) on a permanent basis, but 
still attended communal meetings.  The majority of these members no longer exploit 
natural resources.  People who conduct intermittent migrant work outside the community 
but still lived in the community on an intermittent basis were included in the study since 
they often attended community meetings and utilized community natural resources.  In 
several communities, absentee members were eliminated from community meetings.  
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Several communities were severely affected by migration to the cities, so much 
so that their inclusion in the study was not feasible.  These communities were Mauricios, 
El Alamo, and El Pajonal.  Emilio Carranza’s road was in poor condition and was 
inaccessible at the time.  Thus, this community was not included in the study.  Two 
communities (La Cienega and El Potrero) were sold in their entirety; thus they were not 
sampled. The ejidos that were included in this study are: Cieneguilla, La Trinidad, 
Laguna de Sanchez, Pablo Sidar, Paso de Guadalupe y Mariposa, Real de Canada y 
Anexos, and San Jose de las Boquillas.  The comunidades that were included in this 
study are Canoas, Laguna de Sanchez, Mireles y Anexos, San Antonio de las Osmenta, 
San Juan Bautista, San Sebastian, and Santa Cruz.   
Although a census sampling methodology attempts to survey all members, due to 
the fact that respondents were not always available a sample size formula was used.  To 
ensure that an appropriate confidence interval could be achieved, so that the sample was 
statistically adequate.  The national park estimates that there were 9,335 park inhabitants 
in 2008 (CONANP, 2007) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) stated that the park had 2,000 inhabitants (UNESCO, 2011).  
Given the disparity between the population estimates by the national park and UNESCO, 
I also attempted to estimate the population in the survey to ensure the sample size was 
large enough. The population was estimated by asking community members about their 
community population on during the survey and then selecting the median of all 
responses.  The average was perceived to be skewed since in some responses certain 
individuals gave answers that are substantially larger or smaller than the norm.  Thus, 
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the population responses were only utilized for this study for the descriptive statistics.  
The UNESCO population number was used for the sample size formula.   
Power is the ability of a statistical test to detect the effect if the effect exists 
(Cohen, 1988).  There are two types of power alpha (α) and beta (β) that help define the 
probability of error.  Alpha (α) defines the type I error in which there is an incorrect 
rejection of the null hypothesis.  Beta (β), type II error, is the probability of falsely 
accepting the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true (Neyman, 1952).  
The alpha in this study was set to .05 and the beta .7.  The standard deviation (S) for the 
population was unknown so an S of .5 was chosen.  This is a conservative estimate since 
         , which attains its maximal value when p = ½. The margin of error (e) is 
.08.  The sample size formula used is (Kuehl & Kuehl, 2000): 
   (
          
   
  
) 
where Zα is the value associated with the confidence level which is 95% for this sample 
and thus Z takes a value of 1.96 (Zar, 1984).  Zβ  is 0.5238 from the Z table.  Based on 
this formula, a sample size of 241 was desirable. However, since this is a finite 
population, a finite filter was used (Lohr, 2010). 
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 With a n0 of 241 and an N of 9,335 this gave an n of 235.  With a n0 of 241 and an N of 
2,000 this gave an n of 215.  We collected 235 surveys from this population.  The dataset 
had a total of 61 women respondents, which was about 25% of the total sample.   
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3.2.4 Survey Implementation 
Face-to-face interviews were adopted to facilitate communication and increase 
the response rate.  Three surveyors conducted household surveys for this population, 
including Kathryn Clifton, Alfredo Dafne Ramirez, and Antonio Hernandez.  Surveys 
were checked upon completion.  There were certain questions that were frequently left 
blank primarily because the respondent did not want to answer or did not know the 
answer.  These questions were left blank.  Originally, we planned to sample every other 
house due to simplicity in implementation.  However, upon our arrival in the field it 
became apparent that many people were away working in the city.  Thus, every 
household in the community was sampled so that a statistically significant sample could 
be achieved.  A household was defined as a couple who was married or widowed with 
any dependent children.  If a separate married couple lived in the same building, they 
were a separate household.       
3.3 Survey Data Analysis and Hypothesis Testing 
3.3.1 General Approach 
Analysis of data included descriptive statistics, binary logistic regression, and 
ordinal logistic regression also known as polytomous regression.  Descriptive statistics 
were important to understand the different socioeconomic realities in the park and 
common trends among respondents.  This was helpful in specifying and further 
interpreting the binary and ordinal logistic models.  A normal distribution is not required 
for a logistical regression model (Agresti, 2007).  Ordinal logistic regression was used 
for questions that had scaled responses.  Binary logistic regression was used to test the 
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relationship between variables when the dependent variable was dichotomous.  All 
regression models were estimated using the backward step-wise Wald approach. 
Binary logistic regression is a statistical method for describing the 
interrelationship between a dichotomous dependent variable and multiple independent 
variables.  The model can be written as (Agresti, 2007): 
     [    ]      (
    
       
)       
where π(X) represents the probability of selecting the dependent variable.  X is the 
vector of the independent variables and β is the vector of regression coefficients 
associated with X, it is also the slope and measures the steepness of the regression line.  
The intercept α, measures the value where the regression line crosses the y axis.  A Wald 
test was used to perform backward stepwise regression.  This is helpful in eliminating 
independent variables that do not have a statistically significant relationship with the 
dependent variable.  The (1-α) confidence interval of estimated β (Agresti, 2007) is: 
 ̂      (SE) 
Where  ̂ having a chi-squared form depends on the curvature of the log-likelihood 
function at the point where it is maximzed.  A greater curvature gives a smaller standard 
error (SE).  The area under the standard normal curve on each side of the normal 
distribution tail is     .  The asymptotic distribution of the Wald statistic is chi-square 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters estimated (Agresti, 2007).  
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test of goodness of fit is obtained by conducting a chi-square 
test on a 2 x g contingency table.   The contingency table is constructed by cross-
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classifying the dichotomous dependent variable with a grouping variable (with g groups) 
in which groups are formed by partitioning the predicted probabilities using the 
percentiles of the predicted event probability (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).    The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000)  
 is computed as: 
   ∑
          
 
           
 
   
 
The p value is given by Pr (χ2≥ χ2HL) where χ
2
 is the chi-square statistic distributed with 
degrees of freedom (g-n), the default value of n is 2 (SAS Institute, 2011).  This is 
helpful in determining which model has the best fit.  Only models that had a significance 
of p> 0.05 were interpreted.  Collinearity diagnosis were conducted for the models to 
assure that the independent variables were not inter-related.  A variance inflation factor 
(VIF) of less than three was obtained for all variables, indicating that there was no 
statistical evidence of collinearity in the final models selected.  
Ordinal logistic regression was run for all models with scaled responses.  While 
multinomial logistic regression can be used, ordinal logistical regression results have 
simpler interpretations and potentially greater power than baseline-category logit 
models.  A cumulative probability for Y is the probability that Y falls at or below a 
particular point.   For outcome category j, the cumulative probability is (Agresti, 2007 p. 
180): 
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The score test for the proportional odds assumption was used to determine the goodness 
of fit.  This tested whether the parameters are the same across logits, simultaneously for 
all predictors.  Models with score values of Pr > ChiSq  greater than 0.05 were 
interpreted. The model used for the score test for the proportional odds assumption was 
the same as the cumulative logit model, and it is (Agresti, 2007): 
     [      ]                                
A cumulative probability for Y was the probability that Y falls at or below category j.  
The above formula shows the cumulative probability for j.  In this model, βk is the 
increase in log-odds of falling into or below any category associated with a one-unit 
increase in Xk, holding all the other X-variables constant.  This model uses cumulative 
probabilities up to a threshold, thereby making the whole range of ordinal categories 
binary at that threshold.  The response is Y=1,2,..., k  where the ordering is natural. x1, 
x2, xk are indicator or dummy variables, they indicate categories for the predictors.  
Multicollinearity tests were run for all models, and variables are removed that have a 
VIF of three or greater.  This is to assure that explanatory variables in the regression 
models were not highly correlated one another.  The formula used is (O’Brien, 2007): 
              
           
 
         
 
where   
  was the coefficient of determination of a regression of dependent variable j on 
all independent variables. A tolerance of less than 0.20 or 0.10 and/or a VIF of 5 or 10 
and above indicates a possible multicollinearity problem (O'Brien, 2007).  In this study, 
the independent variables with a VIF greater than or equal to three were removed. 
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CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.1 Demographic, Socio-Economic, and Political Overview 
Organizational Structure 
There were more ejidos than comunidades in the park.  The park had the highest 
concentration of comunidades in the state of Nuevo Leon.  Comunidades had a looser 
organizational structure where all members of the family can continue to be part of the 
communal land and have the same right of ownership as other members.  Often 
individual parcels and communal grazing were not as strictly defined as required in ejido 
systems.  One community in particular had both a comunidad and ejido structure in 
different parts of the community but is known as one entity.  It also had the largest 
population in the park.  One comunidad was in the process of registering for ejido status 
so that members of the comunidad could sell individual parcels.  Of the respondents 
59.7%  were from ejidos, 24.2%  from comunidades, and  15.3%  from both.  See figure 
1 for the response rate from both organizational structures. 
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Figure 1. Responses from Different Organizational Structures. The dark grey bars represent the number of 
respondents for each land tenure type.  The light grey bars represent the percentage of respondents for 
each land tenure type. 
 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
The majority of the survey respondents were male 74.9%, and only 25.1% were 
female.  This reflects the fact that the majority of the ejidos had a male family member 
that attended the community meetings.  In general, women only attended ejido meetings 
if they were a widow or if their husband was unable to be present.  Many of the 
respondents (57.4%) received governmental assistance; the programs that received the 
greatest enrollment were Oportunidades and a pension program for the elderly with 
SEDESOL (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social- Secretary of Social Development).  
Oportunidades is a national program that pays mothers when their children attend school 
with minimal absences and when they attend doctors’ appointments.  The SEDESOL 
pension program is a program that assists the elderly ages 65 and up.  The age of 
respondents was not asked however; it appears that the park was inhabited by elderly 
people and the majority of the younger generation appeared to have gone to the city or 
other areas in search of other opportunities. It was not surprising that 41.4 percent of 
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respondents did not have children in their households.  Some 40.3 percent of the 
respondents had 1-2 children in the household.  Many respondents stated that they had 
multiple adult children. If the older children were not dependents they were not included 
in the household count in Table 1.  Access to schooling varied by community.  The 
absence of a school or only a remote school, with a television for instruction, was 
common in small communities at high elevations that lacked paved roads.  When talking 
to a teacher in the park it was apparent that they struggled to recruit teachers in many 
locations throughout the park.  Respondents were asked how many years of schooling 
they attended.  The numbers were then grouped into correspondent categories of 
primary, middle, secondary, and collegiate.  Please note the percentage response does 
not represent the completion of any of these categories.  Given the poor accessibility of 
school in some locations, it was not a surprise that 12.6% of the respondents have not 
attended school and 53.3% have attended primary school at one time (Table 1).  Only 
7.8% of the respondents attended secondary school (high school).   
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Table 1. Demographic Characteristic of Respondents 
Percentage of Response (%) 
Gender Government Assistance 
Male (n=176) 74.9                            Yes    (n=134) 57.4 
Female (n=59) 25.1                              No    (n=101) 42.6 
Children in Household Years of School 
0 Children (n=84) 41.4 No Schooling - 0 Years (n=29) 12.6 
1 Child (n=14) 16.3   Primary - ≥1 and ≤6 (n=117) 53.3 
2 Children (n=49)                                                      24.1 Middle - ≥7 and ≤ 9 (n=56) 24.3 
3 Children (n=17 8.4 Secondary - ≥10 and ≤ 13 (n=18) 7.8 
4 Children (n=15) 7.4  Collegiate -  ≥14 and ≤ 19 (n=9) 3.8 
7, 9, 10 Children (n=5) 2.5   
 
 
 
Livestock Profile  
The survey respondents were actively engaged in agricultural activities; however 
very few relied on agriculture for the majority of their income.  Figure 2 shows that 
many of the respondents (45.1%) relied on agriculture for only 25% of their income.   
Wiggins et al. (2002) found a similar result, only a small fraction of income came from 
agriculture in a case study of four ejidos  in central Mexico in different climate regions 
with different agricultural crops; however, the majority (78%) practiced agriculture and 
it seemed to be predominantly for subsistence.  Agriculture may still be a significant 
source of income for the 57% of the respondents in this study who received 
governmental assistance or those who were retired.  Livestock was a common 
agricultural activity for many with 64.0% of the respondents owning cows, 33.9% 
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owning horses, 27.7% owning goats, and 25.9% owning donkeys and mules.  Very few 
reported owning sheep, only 3.0% (figure 3).  Livestock was used mainly for 
transportation and meat consumption as very little was earned from livestock. 
Respondents were asked about the annual income derived from livestock, and 44% of 
the respondents indicated that they earned between 500 and 775 pesos per year 
approximately $41- 64.43 US dollars/year at the time of the survey.  Nineteen percent of 
the respondents made between 775-2,500 pesos per year (64.43-207.84 US dollars a 
year) and 17% earned between 2,500-4,500 pesos per year (207.84-374.11 US dollars a 
year) (Figure 4).  The majority of respondents (67%) did not have fencing to exclude 
grazing from different owners.  However, 69.4% of respondents stated that they used 
natural boundaries to exclude grazing from different owners (Figure 5).  This area was 
historically a goat herding area; however, much of this has changed with meat 
consumption preferences of beef and government supported programs that pay mothers 
to keep their children in school, reducing the number of children available for herding.  
Thus, when respondents were asked if their sales of livestock had increased, decreased, 
or stayed the same over the past ten years the majority of respondents, 79.91%, stated 
that it had decreased and only 3% reported that it had increased (Table 2).  Almost all 
respondents replied that they grazed their animals in the communal area (90.9 %).  Only 
29.3% of respondents stated that they cut, dried, and stored hay, therefore a low 
percentage of respondents used this as a resilience mechanism in the face of drought.  
Thus, many communities forced members to sell animals during droughts; 42.1% stated 
that they were forced to sell animals in the case of drought.  General patterns emerging 
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from a historical analysis suggest that drought impacts are frequent and often severe 
especially in northern Mexico (Liverman, 1999).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of Income Derived from Agriculture. Each column represents the percentage of 
respondents that reported the share that agriculture income has in their home. The number of respondents 
is listed next to the percentage share of income. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Type of Animals Owned. Each column represents the percentage of respondents that own 
different types of animals.   
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Figure 4. Pesos Earned per Year from the Sale of Livestock. Each column represents the percentage of 
respondents that pertain to the each listed income group range.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Pasture Fencing.  Each column represents the percentage response of the type of fencing used to 
for grazing animals.     
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Table 2. Livestock Management Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agriculture Business Profile 
It was apparent that a few communities had successful agro-businesses and 
collaborations that helped them sell to external markets; however, that experience 
seemed to be limited. Respondents were asked if there were groups in the community 
that had been successful in marketing products or providing benefits at a discounted rate; 
only 13% stated yes.  Only 16.9% stated that resources in the community are pooled 
together for sale (Table 3).  By having larger volumes of commodities farmers can 
achieve better pricing in external markets that require larger minimum sale volumes. 
Microfinance groups are also not common in the community as only 11% of respondents 
stated that there were any.  Individual parcels are seldom rented to external livestock 
owners as only 15% of respondents answered the question in the affirmative.  
 
 
Sale of livestock increase or decrease 
over the last 10 years 
Hay cut dried and stored 
             Decreased (N=189) 79.91           No (N=162) 70.7 
           Staid the Same (N=39) 17.03            Yes (N=67) 29.3 
Increased (N=7) 3.05   
 Graze in communal area Forced Selling of Animals 
                               No (N=21) 9.1           No (N=132) 57.89 
                            Yes (N=211) 90.9            Yes (N=96) 42.1 
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Table 3. Agribusiness Statistics 
Cooperative Success Pooling for Sale Microfinance Land Rented to External 
Livestock Owners 
No  (N=187) 87 
      
No (N=192) 83.1   No  (N=205) 88.4  No (N=198) 85.0 
Yes  (N=28) 13 
       
Yes (N=39) 16.9 Yes (N=27) 11.6  Yes (N=35) 15.0 
 
 
 
Community Characteristics 
In general the communities seemed to have many desirable characteristics. The 
majority (83.8%) of respondents felt that the natural resource monitors did their job 
responsibly and that most of the community leaders had prior leadership experience 
(65.4% of respondents said so).  A high percentage (75.6%) of respondents agreed that 
their community was always or usually managed in a transparent way.  Almost a quarter 
of respondents, 24.5%, stated that their community is sometimes or never managed in a 
transparent way (Figure 6).  The majority of the communities in this study are small in 
size as 79.9% of the respondents stated that they have less than 100 members.  Baland & 
Platteau (1998) and Wade (1988 & 1994) have stated that the size of communities is 
important and that smaller communities are apt to have greater success.  In this study, 
the size of the communities is generally small; with 80.3% of the respondents stating that 
their communities had ≤ 100 people.  Communities between 100-250 people comprised 
of 8% of the respondents, as well as communities between 500-700 people.  The 
distribution of the responses can be seen in Figure 7.  Supposedly, parcels can only be 
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sold in ejidos to external members; however, a few respondents from comunidades 
stated that parcels in their community were sold although it was illegal.  Since in general 
comunidades are not supposed to have parcels sold in the community only 177 
respondents answered the question.  The majority (80.2%) of respondents stated that 
parcels had not been sold in their community.  The distribution of responses can be 
found in Figure 8. Only 8.4% said that between 1-3 individual parcels had been sold in 
their community.  Another 6.8% respondents stated that between 4 and 10 parcels had 
been sold to external people.  Very few respondents stated that over 10 parcels had been 
sold.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Community Transparency.  Each column represents the percentage of response for the different 
transparency levels reported from the survey.  Under each response category the number of respondents is 
reported.  On top of each column lists the percentage of respondents. 
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Figure 7. Estimated Community Population.   Each column represents a range of people that exist in the 
community reported from surveys.   The number for respondents is listed underneath the range.  On top of 
each column the percentage of respondents is listed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Parcels Sold Externally.   Each bar represents the percentage of respondents that reported within 
a range of the number of land parcels sold externally in the community.  Underneath each range of parcels 
sold externally lists the number of respondents.  On top of each bar lists the percentage of respondents.   
 
 
 
External Government Relationships 
The majority of respondents (94.0%) stated that other governmental authorities 
respect local decision-making (Table 4).  Apparently, external governments were 
involved in local enforcement of rules since 64% of respondents stated that other 
governmental or park authorities sanction bad natural resource management.  However, 
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only 54% stated that other governmental authorities respected local punishment, only 
10.3% stated that they did not support local decisions, and 35.4% stated that external 
governments are not involved in local decisions.  It was assumed that there was less 
external government involvement in communities that were difficult to reach.    
 
 
Table 4. External Government Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Logit Regression Results 
In total, four logistic regression models were constructed and estimated.  One 
analysis was conducted to understand how effectively conservation is being promoted 
amongst communities in the park and what variables influence conservation promotion.  
A second was conducted to understand factors that affect overharvesting and 
overgrazing in these communities.  Lastly, an analysis was conducted to assess how well 
users follow rules and how well users trust members to follow the rules.  Backward 
conditional analysis was used to eliminate variables that did not hold a significant 
relationship using SAS statistical software.  Many variables were eliminated and a 
suitable basis for developing the models was achieved.  Table 5 lists the survey  
Other Governmental Authorities 
Respect Local Decisions 
Other Governmental or Park 
Authorities Sanction Bad Natural 
Resource Management 
          No  (N=14) 6.0%    No  (N=82) 36.0% 
         Yes  (N=219) 94.0%    Yes (N=146) 64.0% 
Other Governmental Authorities 
Respect Local Punishments 
 
          No (N=23) 10.3% 
Gov Not Involved (N=79) 35.4% 
Yes (N=121) 54.3% 
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Table 5. Variable Descriptions and Measurements 
 
Qst
n # 
Variable 
Name 
Description Response Key 
2 Com_Ejid Are you a member of a communal land or ejido? (0=Communal 1=both   
2=Ejido) 
5 gzhaprm How many hectares are you allowed to graze? (number) 
7 past_bnd How clear are the boundaries in which members are 
allowed to graze? 
(1=very clear  2=clear 
3=slightly clear 4=not 
clear) 
15 groups Are there any groups or organizations that exist within 
this community? 
(0=No   1=Yes) 
21 cm_trnsp Is the commuity managed in a transparent way? (1=Never2=Sometim-
es 3=Usually 
4=Always) 
26 microfin Are there any groups that participate in microfinance in 
the community? 
(0=No   1=Yes) 
30 pstr_fnc Are fences used to exclude grazing from different 
livestock owners? 
(0=No   1=Yes) 
31 pstr_ntbn Are there natural boundaries (such as streams) that are 
used to exclude grazing from different livestock 
owners? 
(0=No   1=Yes) 
32 pst_rot Does this community practice rotational grazing? (0=No   1=Yes) 
40 gov_pun Do other governmental or park authorities sanction bad 
natural resource management or rule breaking? 
(0=No   1=Yes) 
41 cnsv_cmp Do community members receive compensation for 
conservation activities? 
(0=No   1=Yes) 
42 gv_assis Is any member of your family enrolled in a government 
program that assists you financially in any way? 
(0=No   1=Yes) 
47 overgraz Do you think that pasture is overstocked with animals or 
overgrazed by community members? 
(0=No   1=Yes) 
48 overharv Do you think that other resources are over harvested or 
that the demand is too high? 
(0=No   1=Yes) 
51 Rcom_ma
de 
Are management rules within the community created by 
members of this community/ 
(0=No   1=Yes) 
53 RuleB_pn Are rule breakers punished? (0=No   1=Yes) 
55 Foll_rul How well do you trust other community members to 
follow the established rules? 
(1=Never 2=Some-
times  3=Usually  
4=Always) 
56 Cmnc_Nt
R 
How often do you communicate with other community 
members about resource management? 
(1=Every few months  
2=Monthly  3=Weekly  
4=Daily) 
57 prop_sld If you are a member of an ejido, how many parcels have 
been sold to people outside the community? 
(number) 
61 Park_cnsv How has the establishment of the park affected your 
natural resource management practices? 
(1=toward less con-
servation 2=no impact  
3= toward more con-
servation) 
63 train_time
P 
Has anyone come to your community to offer a training?  
If so, how frequently do they come? 
(0=never  1=yes) 
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questions and the codes for all the variables that were used in the regression models, 
including the question number, a variable description, and a key explaining how 
responses were coded.  The models were validated using several statistical tests 
including the Chi-Square Score test for the Proportional Odds Assumption (for ordinal 
models), the Hosemer Lemeshow Goodness of Fit test (for binary models), the Wald test 
for significance, and the log likelihood test for overall fit.        
4.2.1 Park Impact on Conservation 
The establishment of the park has affected the natural resource management 
practices of ejidos and comunidades that reside within or have boundaries inside the 
park.  When asked how the establishment of the park has affected member’s natural 
resource management practices, 14.7% stated-toward less conservation, 43.6% stated-no 
impact, and 41.8% stated toward more conservation.  Park conservation was logistically 
regressed on compensation, pasture rotation, pasture boundaries, number of trainings 
received in a year, and the frequency of communication with other members about 
natural resource management.  A few variables in the survey were significantly related 
to these responses (Table 6) and merit further review to understand how park promoted 
conservation can be improved.   
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Table 6. Park Conservation Ordinal Logit Regression Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compensation 
Only 13.4% of respondents stated that community members received 
compensation.  Respondents that stated that members in their community received 
compensation were less likely to think that the park has improved their conservation 
practices when compared to respondents who had not received compensation, with a p-
value of 0.0189 and an estimated coefficient of -1.0011.  A one unit increase in 
compensation going from 0 to 1 (no compensation-0 to compensation-1) had an 
expected -1.0011 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level of park 
conservation, given all the other variables in the model are held constant.  Members who 
Dependent Independent 
   Prk_cnsv (cnsv_cmp, Pst_rot, cmnc_NtR, Past_bnd,  Trn_t_Yr)  
       
 Variable 
Code DF Estimate  
Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Pr>ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1 -0.431 0.3973 1.1765 0.2781 
Intercept 2 1 2.0943 0.429 23.8325 <.0001 
cnsv_cmp 1 1 -1.0011 0.4265 5.509 0.0189 
Pst_rot 1 1 -0.9179 0.3935 5.4425 0.0197 
cmnc_NtR 2 1 -0.3736 0.3725 1.0058 0.3159 
cmnc_NtR 3 1 -0.5796 0.4098 1.9998 0.1573 
cmnc_NtR 4 1 -0.3486 0.4152 0.705 0.4011 
Past_bnd 2 1 -1.1274 0.3907 8.3288 0.0039 
Past_bnd 3 1 -1.1568 0.5118 5.1084 0.0238 
Past_bnd 4 1 -0.8069 0.6707 1.4472 0.229 
Trn_t_Yr  
1 -0.231 0.1271 3.3024 0.0692 
  
Cases Included in Analysis 
N=194 
(82.6%)     
 
-2 Log Likelihood 384.896 
  
  
Correct Model Prediction 
Percentage  
66.5 
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had received compensation generally received it for labor affiliated with assisting with 
stopping forest fires, planting seedlings, or maintaining nurseries.  Lindberg et al. (1996) 
associated negative attitudes of park residents with perceptions of not receiving a fair 
share of the benefits.  Several authors propose inclusion of communities in the 
designation process and decision making related to compensation.  Overlooking this can 
further hamper the implementation of conservation goals (Li & Liu, 2010; Abakerli, 
2001; Frauman & Banks, 2011).     
Pasture Rotation 
Only 10.6% of the respondents stated that they practiced rotational grazing, thus 
it is not a widely adapted practice in these communities.  Rotational grazing is loosely 
defined here as people that move their animals from one area to the next.  Only a loose 
definition could be used since so few people practiced this.  Those that stated that they 
practiced rotational grazing were more likely to state the park had lessened their 
conservation practices (p = 0.0197; regression coefficient = -0.9179).  A one unit 
increase going from 0 to 1 (no rotation-0 to rotation-1), would see an expected 0.9179 
decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level of park conservation, given all of the 
other variables in the model are held constant. Semi-nomadic and nomadic pastoralists 
are citied as often times having rich conservation knowledge (Stave et al., 2007; 
Goldman, 2003; Fernandez-Gimenez, 2000).  It is possible that those who rotated their 
animals for grazing had a superior conservation knowledge as shown in Stave et 
al.(2007) when he compared the ecological knowledge of semi-nomadic to sedentary 
pastoralists.  While those who rotate their animals are not nomadic they are more mobile 
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than the other herders in the study area. Different resource users and income groups can 
have different tendencies to support conservation measures (Mehta & Kellert, 1998; 
Natura, 1995).  It is evident here that those who rotate their animals were less likely to 
think the park had improved their conservation practices.  Park promoted conservation or 
park acceptance amongst this group may be more difficult to achieve. 
Pasture Boundaries 
Wade (1988 & 1994)  and Ostrom (1990) specified the importance of the clarity 
of boundaries for communal land management success.  Boundary clarity is also 
mentioned in conservation literature; unclear boundaries are seen as a threat to 
conservation that can lead to conflict (Wunder et al., 2008; Yasmi et al., 2007; Mugisha 
et al., 2004).  When respondents were asked “How clear are the boundaries in which 
members are allowed to graze,” 16.6% responded “very clear,” 64.3% responded 
“clear,” 13.2% responded “slightly clear,” and 6% responded “not clear.”  Respondents 
that selected “clear” were less likely to think the park has positively influenced their 
conservation practices compared to those that stated “very clear” (p = 0.0039; regression 
coefficient = -1.1274).   A one unit increase in boundary clarity going from the base of 1 
(very clear) to 2 (clear) would expect to see a 1.1274 decrease in the log odds of being in 
a higher park conservation category, given all of the other variables in the model are 
held constant.  Respondents that selected “slightly clear” were less likely to think that 
the park had positively influenced their conservation practices compared to those that 
selected “very clear,” with a p value of 0.0238 and an estimated regression coefficient of 
-1.1568.  An increase in pasture boundary clarity going from 0 (very clear) to 3 (slightly 
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clear) would expect to see a 1.1568 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher park 
conservation category, given all of the other variables in the model are held constant.  
Those that answered “not clear” did not hold a significant relationship with park 
promoted conservation practices.  The park had a more positive impact in communities 
where boundaries were very clear.  It is possible that respondents that stated “very clear” 
have received clarification from external government authorities.  Efforts to clarify 
boundaries amongst community members who had “slightly clear” and “clear” property 
boundaries could improve conservation promotion amongst park communal land 
inhabitants. Since only 16.6% of respondents selected “very clear” and 77.5% of 
respondents selected “clear” and “slightly clear,” additional clarification could have 
substantial benefits by preventing users from grazing outside of the community 
boundary further promoting plant regeneration in the buffer areas around human 
settlements.  
Training Times per Year 
Trainings are a common method to promote conservation amongst natural 
resource users.  However, trainings can have varied success rates in promoting 
conservation and adaptation (Deressa et al., 2009; Mehta & Kellert, 1998; Fujisaka, 
1993).   Trainings were often mentioned in the field, and to understand its effect on 
conservation promotion it was included in this study.  Multiple conservation actors 
(SEMARNAP, CONANP, and local NGOs) and governmental actors (municipal and 
government assistance agencies) were stated to have given trainings in these 
communities.  However, the vast majority of the respondents could not recall from 
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whom they had received training.  Figure 9 shows a distribution of responses regarding 
the frequency of trainings received in the last year.  The majority of respondents (67.8%) 
stated that they have not received training in the last year, and 32.2% stated that they did 
receive one or more trainings in the last year.  Respondents who received more trainings 
were less likely to state that the park had improved the respondents conservation 
practices with a p= 0.0692 and an estimated regression coefficient of 0.231.  This 
variable was not significant at the 95% confidence level and thus there is no need to be 
interpreted further.      
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Number of Trainings Received in the Last Year.  Each column represents number of trainings 
attended in a year.  The percentage of respondents that attended each training frequency is listed at the top 
of the bar graph.  
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The Frequency of Communication about Natural Resource Management 
Communication frequency around natural resource management was included in 
the logistic regression model due to its possible influence on trustworthiness and fairness 
with the park.  In a study conducted amongst trustee’s and tustors the level of perceived 
trustworthiness was effected by the frequency of communication (Becerra & Gupta, 
2003).   The frequency of communication about natural resource management could also 
influence the respondents trustworthiness of the park.  In a study examining the complex 
relationships between superiors and subordinates fairness perceptions were found to 
often be constructed by workgroup members through discourse (Sias & Jablin, 1995). 
Thus, increased communication frequency could influence how the park either promotes 
or discourages conservation practices by increasing trust and fairness perceptions. 
Baland & Platteau (1996), and Wade (1988 & 1994) stated that interdependence among 
members and ease of enforcement of rules are important for successful communal land 
management.  To inquire about this relationship further, questions were asked of the 
respondents about the frequency of communication regarding natural resource 
management among communal members to determine its importance.  However, it did 
not have a significant relationship with park promoted conservation practices in this case 
study.    Perhaps members are not talking often about the park when discussing natural 
resource management.  
Summary 
Conservation norms are not easily introduced into a community through external 
actors.  Little is known about what strategies successfully alter the norms people hold 
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about conservation, particularly when the resources in question are relied upon for 
subsistence (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999).  Conservation promotion acceptance may also 
vary between groups (Mehta & Kellert, 1998; Natura, 1995).  Respondents who stated 
that members in their community has received compensation for conservation were less 
likely to state that the park has improved their respondents conservation practices.  
Including communities in the decision making on conservation could potentially 
improve this relationship further.  Respondents who practice rotational grazing were less 
likely to state that the park has improved their conservation practices.  Promoting 
conservation amongst this group may be more difficult and could use further research 
and inquiry.  Respondents, who stated that pasture boundaries are “very clear,” were 
more likely to think that the park has improved their conservation practices compared to 
respondents who stated “clear” or “slightly clear”.  Communal lands could further 
promote conservation by clarifying boundaries amongst all communal members.  The 
number of trainings received in the last year and the frequency of communication about 
natural resource management amongst communal members was not significant.  One 
pertinent finding while conducting household surveys is that multiple government actors 
have come to the area to give trainings and often times the respondents cannot recall 
what agency they are associated with and lump other actors together with the park.  It is 
pertinent that the park further knows who is conducting trainings and what is being 
covered, as it appears that these trainings are also influencing resident’s perceptions of 
the park.  
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4.2.2 Overgrazing and Overharvesting 
Baland & Platteau (1996), Wade (1998 & 1994), and Ostrom (1990) mentioned 
that communal institutional characteristics could lead to ecological sustainability.  In an 
effort to quantify sustainability, questions regarding overgrazing and overharvesting 
were tested. Respondents were asked, “Do you think that pasture is overstocked with 
animals or overgrazed by community members?” Respondents are only allowed to graze 
in their communal grazing area or individual parcel.  Overgrazing in this question 
specifically refers to the respondents community and was implied in the question.  There 
are multiple herders in these communities and only animal owners were interviewed.  
Thus the results are based on perceptions, not physical quantities.  It should be noted that 
perceptions may vary.  Respondents were also asked, “Do you think that other resources 
are over harvested or that the demand is too high?”.  This was followed by an open-
ended question regarding what other resources they were refereeing to.  Seventeen open-
ended responses were received.  Seven of the respondents referred to wood and trees. 
Six respondents referred to fruit such as peaches, pears, apples, plums, quince, or wine 
grapes.  Two respondents referred to water, mountain range, and wheat and corn.  One 
respondent referred to soil, and another respondent refereed to herbs that grow wild in 
the area.  Thus, the resources are varied but the highest response was with wood and 
trees.  Cutting of live wood was sanctioned by SEMERNAP  and the park (CONANP).  
The dependent variables (overharvesting and overgrazing) were then linearly regressed 
with independent variables regarding communal institutional characteristics.  
Interestingly, there were different institutional characteristics that were significantly 
 72 
 
related to the presence and absence of overharvesting and overgrazing.  It is apparent 
that different resources have different governing relationships.   
Overgrazing 
 Little is known about what institutional characteristics lead to overgrazing in 
ejidos and comunidades.  Overgrazing in Mexican ejidos has been characterized as a 
result of property management deterioration (Wilson & Thompson, 1993).  Ejidos have 
also been cited to have more native vegetation and have also been shown to be just as 
productive as private lands (Coronado-Quintana et al., 2001).  To understand what 
institutional characteristics are associated with the absence and presence of overgrazing, 
a binary logit model was estimated (Table 7) with the following independent variables: 
government assistance, organizational structure type (ejido or comunidad), external 
government punishment for bad natural resource management, park promoted 
conservation, and hectares permitted for grazing.  
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Table 7. Binary Logit Regression for Overgrazing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hectares Permitted for Grazing 
When respondents were asked how many hectares they were allowed to graze in 
their community, 68 different values were reported with a range from 0-11600 hectares.  
Hectares that are allowed for grazing refer to the communal grazing area for the 
respondents community.   When the responses were grouped, 56% of the respondents 
stated that they had between 0-100 hectares permitted for grazing, 16.5% between 125-
500 hectares, 13.2%between 600-2,500 hectares, and 14.3% between 2,965-11,600 
hectares permitted for grazing.  The land size of the communal resource base has been a 
proxy for communal land management since the beginning of the subject.  While many 
authors and researchers suggest that small communities are better for successful natural 
resource management, there are small communities that have unsuccessful management 
and nomadic groups that manage large areas successfully (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999).  
Dependent Independent 
Overgraze (Gv_assis, com_Ejid, gov_pun, Prk_cnsv,  gz_haprm) 
 Variable 
Code  DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr>ChiSq 
Intercept  
1 -2.9438 1.1603 6.4365 0.0112 
Gv_assis 1 1 1.1007 0.482 5.2138 0.0224 
com_Ejid 0 1 3.0260 1.1924 6.4406 0.0112 
com_Ejid 1 1 3.8710 1.1048 12.2761 0.0005 
gov_pun 1 1 -1.4549 0.4972 8.5637 0.0034 
Prk_cnsv 2 1 -2.2493 0.8168 7.5828 0.0059 
Prk_cnsv 3  
-0.6589 0.7283 0.8186 0.3656 
gz_haprm 3 1 0.000178 0.000068 6.8268 0.009 
  
Cases Included in Analysis 
N=151 
(64.3%)     
 
-2 Log Likelihood 185.652 
  
  
Correct Model Prediction 
Percentage  
87 
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The size for the resource base was included to determine its level of importance in this 
area.  For every one hectare increase respondents were more likely to state that there is 
overgrazing, with a p value of 0.0009 and an estimated regression coefficient of 
0.000178.  A one unit increase in hectares permitted to be grazed would expect a 
0.000178 increase in the log odds of being in a higher level of overgrazing, given all of 
the other variables in the model are held constant.  This can have a larger impact over 
hundreds and thousands of hectares.  There may be several factors influencing this 
relationship.  The areas that are being mentioned here is the communal grazing area 
where permits are not needed.  Permits are only for harvesting trees.  Larger areas are 
harder to monitor and/or the rebound effect.  The rebound effect refers to how the 
quantity demanded of a good increases as its price declines.  In this case, as there is more 
area at a lesser cost, there is more overgrazing.  This effect is also apparent in 
transportation.  Transportation researchers have long recognized that any changes that 
reduce congestion will cause travel on the congested facility to increase.  This is 
assuming the absence of an offsetting deterrent (Thomson, 1967; Smeed, 1968; Downs, 
1962).  To provide an offsetting deterrent for overgrazing in larger areas, multiple 
monitors and systematic livestock rotation could be helpful in reducing overgrazing. 
Ejidos and Comunidades 
Respondents could be from three organizational arrangements: ejidos, 
comunidades, or both.  Ejidos had larger populations in general and comprised of 59.9% 
of the respondents, comunidades were 24.2% of the respondents, and 15.3% of the 
respondents were from both.  When comunidades were compared to the base of ejido, 
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comunidades were 19.61 times more likely to state there is overgrazing in their 
community, with a p values of 0.0112.  When both were compared to the base of ejido, 
both were 46.99 times more likely to state there is overgrazing in their community, with 
a p values of 0.0005. Comunidades in general were smaller and it seemed that many of 
their members are related.  All members in the community seemed to have equal rights 
to the grazing areas and ability to attend meetings.  In ejidos, if the son had not received 
a land title from his deceased father, he could be restricted from grazing his own animals 
in the communal area since he was not an ejido member.  In a comunidad, on the other 
hand, the sons grazing is still allowed and cannot be contested.  In the ejidos only one 
male family member attends communal meetings.  Meeting attendance appeared to be 
more flexible in the comunidades.  Thus, it was included in the analysis to determine if 
one organizational structure is more susceptible to overgrazing than the other.  Only one 
community, Laguna de Sanchez, reported having both, and they have the largest human 
settlement in the park.  This result of both may reflect the high population density in 
Laguna de Sanchez rather than differences in the organizational structures. 
Government Punishment 
The majority of the respondents (64.8%) stated that other governmental or park 
authorities fined bad natural resource management or rule breaking, and 35.2% stated 
that they did not.   Respondents that stated the government sanctioned bad natural 
resource management were less likely to state that there is overgrazing, with a p value of 
0.0034 and an estimated regression coefficient of -1.454.  A one unit increase in 
government punishment going from 0 (no government punishment) to 1 (government 
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punishment) would expect a decrease of 1.454 in the log odds of being in a higher level 
of overgrazing, given all of the other variables in the model are held constant.  When 
looking at how enforcement and compliance differs with the levels of government in a 
federal system, the literature is scarce and the results are ambiguous (Cohen, 1998).  
Conservation gains in reducing the hunting of large animals in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and 
Zambia, often on communal lands, appear to have come from enforcement and not from 
local acceptance of conservation (Gibson, 1999).  Ostrom & Nagendra (2006) and 
Agrawal & Gibson (1999) support a system of checks and balances for communal lands 
that involves external government enforcement.  External enforcement has shown to be 
effective in reducing the perception of overgrazing in this case study.  However 
continued support for local punishment is important to not replace local rule 
enforcement.  When respondents were asked, “Do other governmental authorities and 
institutions support local punishments for rule breakers?” 10.7% stated no, 35.7% -stated 
that external governments are not involved, and 53.6% stated yes.  External government 
appears to be generally supportive or not involved regarding local rule enforcement.  
The majority of respondents (88.9%) thought that pasture usage was regulated in a fair 
manner for all members.  A fair perception of pasture rules coupled with external 
enforcement has resulted in a decreased perception of overgrazing.  
Park Conservation 
When respondents were asked, “How has the establishment of the park affected 
your natural resource management practices,” 14.7% stated “toward less conservation,” 
43.6% stated “no impact,” and 41.8% stated “toward more conservation.” The 
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respondents who said the park had no impact on their conservation practice were less 
likely to perceive overgrazing on their communal pastureland when compared with those 
who said the park had led to less conservation of their communal natural resources, with 
a p-value of 0.0059 and an estimated regression coefficient of -2.2493. A one unit 
increase in park conservation going from 1 (less conservation) to 2 (no impact) would 
expect a 2.2493 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level of overgrazing, given 
all of the other variables in the model are held constant.   Responses of “toward more 
conservation” did not hold a significant relationship. It is possible that those that stated 
that there is more conservation were thinking of other resources instead of just 
pastureland. 
Summary 
Several key factors were discovered that influence the relationship between 
overgrazing and institutional factors.  Recipients of government assistance were more 
likely to report that there is overgrazing.  While current compensation schemes are not 
successful in promoting conservation some adaptations could enable a compensation 
scheme that could reduce overgrazing amongst government assistance recipients. 
Compensation schemes would have to grouped with rules on conservation practices and 
have external enforcement to be successful.  If participation in such a program is 
voluntary and compensation meets or exceeds their current financial gain in 
overharvesting it is assumed that compliance would be the norm due to the financial 
benefit.  Respondents that stated they had larger grazing areas were more likely to state 
that there is overgrazing.  To provide an offsetting deterrent for overgrazing in larger 
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areas, multiple monitors and systematic livestock rotation could be helpful in reducing 
overgrazing.  When comparing institutional arrangements the mixed system in Laguna 
de Sanchez was significantly more likely to state that there is overgrazing when 
compared to ejidos.  Comunidades were also more likely to state there is overgrazing 
when compared to ejidos.  The defined organizational structure of ejidos with limited 
benefits to one member per household is possibly reducing grazing pressure.   Many 
comunidades mentioned the desire to transition to an ejido structure through PROCEDE.  
The park may help expedite their application with PROCEDE to potentially reduce 
overgrazing in comunidades.  Further research is needed to determine potential benefits 
or costs to the organizational structures (ejido, comunidad, and both).  Respondents who 
selected that external government authorities sanction bad natural resource management 
were less likely to state that there is overgrazing.  Pasture regulations were generally 
perceived to be fair.  Law enforcements by external governmental authorities appear 
helpful in reducing overgrazing and thus should be continued.   
Overharvesting 
Ejidos and comunidades have been shown to have higher conservation habitat 
than private lands (Ortega-Huerta & Kral, 2007).  Ejidos have been cited to promote 
conservation by preserving forests (Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2009; Ellis & Porter-
Bolland, 2008), birds, and mammal species (Ortega-Huerta & Kral, 2007).  
Deforestation in ejidos has also been linked to corn prices and poverty (Deininger & 
Minten, 1999).  Other studies link deforestation with corn yield and the access to 
markets (Perez-Verdin et al,. 2009).  Many important factors are at play in these 
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relationships.  To further understand the presence and absence of overharvesting in the 
communal lands inside the Cumbres de Monterrey National Park, the presence of 
overgrazing is logistically regressed on: microfinance, the presence of other organized 
human groups, pasture fencing and natural boundaries to exclude grazing, external 
government punishment for bad resource use, and the number of properties sold to 
external buyers.  This model was run separately and with different indicators from the 
overgrazing model.  Results are displayed in Table 8.  Overgrazing and overharvesting 
held different significant relationships with external government punishment, and users 
have different perceptions of ownership over these resources.   
 
 
Table 8. Binary Logit Regression Results of Overharvesting 
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Independent 
Overhav (microfin, pst_Ntbn, Gov_pun, groups, pstr_fnc, Prp_sld) 
 Variable 
Code DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr>ChiSq 
Intercept  
1 -6.2899 1.8047 12.1467 0.0005 
Microfin 1 1 1.7901 0.7385 5.8757 0.0154 
pst_Ntbn 1 1 -3.4448 1.5041 5.245 0.022 
Gov_pun 1 1 4.0562 1.5983 6.4408 0.0112 
Groups  
1 1.1314 0.6963 2.6404 0.1042 
pstr_fnc 1 1 2.7603 1.5277 3.2646 0.0708 
Prp_sld  
1 0.1104 0.0453 5.9391 0.0148 
  
Cases Included in Analysis 
N=159 
(67.7%)     
 
-2 Log Likelihood 99.364 
  
  
Correct Model Prediction 
Percentage  
92.6 
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Microfinance 
Only 11.5% of respondents stated that there were groups in their community that 
practiced microfinance.  Respondents who stated that there were microfinance groups in 
their community were 56.75 times more likely to state that there is overharvesting in 
their community than those who did not participate in microfinance, with a p value of 
0.0154.  It is possible that some groups that have access to microfinance are utilizing 
funds to buy equipment that contributes to overharvesting.  Many but not all 
microfinance institutions report on environmental sustainability (Rippey, 2012).   
Amongst microfinance institutions that report on environmental sustainability there is 
not, a sole adapted methodology to measure this (Allet, 2012).  Jetti (2011) argues that 
microfinance is linked to the commons since, “a majority of the loan recipients of 
microfinance loans in the developing world make at least a part of their living by 
utilizing common pool resources (CPR) such as forests, fisheries, agricultural lands, 
mineral resources, waterways and the like.”  Research in this area has proven to be 
difficult, as many micro lenders do not keep documentation of what the loan was used 
for (Goldsworthy, 2010).  Communities and governmental conservation agencies should 
maintain vigilant on natural resource use where microfinance groups are located.   It is 
important to understand what these loans are about and to monitor for what purpose they 
are being used.  
Pasture Natural Boundaries and Fencing 
When respondents were asked if there was fencing to exclude grazing, 67.2% of 
the respondents stated that fencing was not used and 21.8% of respondents stated that 
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fencing was used.  When asked if natural boundaries were used to exclude grazing, 
30.6% stated that natural boundaries were not used and 69.4% stated that natural 
boundaries were used to exclude grazing.  Figure 2 shows a visual depiction of this data.  
Natural boundaries are the prevalent norm for livestock grazing exclusion. Due to the 
high rate of governmental assistance received in the park, fences may be too expensive 
for many of the respondents.  Respondents who selected that natural boundaries were 
used were less likely to select that there was overharvesting in their communities, with a 
p value of 0.022 and an estimated regression coefficient of -3.44.  A one unit increase in 
natural boundaries going from 0 (no natural boundaries) to 1 (natural boundaries) would 
expect a 3.44 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level of overharvesting, given 
all of the other variables in the model are held constant.  Respondents who selected that 
fences were used were 14.804 times more likely, given the positive coefficient, to state 
that there was overharvesting, however, this cannot be interpreted at the 95% confidence 
level since a p value is 0.0708.  This could be an indication that the terrain in the natural 
boundary areas promotes forests instead of pasture.  Further research is needed.  
Property Sold  
The majority of respondents (80.2%) stated that parcels of these lands were not 
sold externally.  For those who stated that parcels were sold externally, between 1-55 
parcels were reported.  Responses were grouped, figure seven shows a distribution of the 
data; 8.4% stated that between 1-3 parcels were sold externally, 6.8% stated that 
between 4-10 parcels were sold externally, 2.9% stated that between 11-17 parcels were 
sold externally, and only 1.7% stated that between 20-55 parcels were sold externally.  
 82 
 
The sale of the communal area in forested ejidos is illegal (Barsimantov et al., 2009).  
The laws passed in 1992 established a legal market for the sale of ejido land that 
replaced an illegal market that is widely acknowledged to exist (Matson, 2012).   
Comunidades were also included in this analysis since there were reported illegal sales 
in comunidades while in the park.  Selling properties in comunidades is not legal; 
however, land can be sold after registering the comunidad as an ejido.  Comunidades 
were included in the analysis since illegal sales in comunidades were mentioned while in 
the field.  With each parcel increment sold externally, respondents are 1.116 times more 
likely to state that there is overharvesting, with a p value of 0.0148.  Ejidos and 
comunidades have been shown to have higher conservation habitat than private lands 
(Ortega-Huerta & Kral, 2007).  It is likely that new owners have the resources to more 
intensively manage their land or performing landscaping that results in habitat reduction.  
Further research is needed to understand what types of overharvesting is occurring 
where there are external buyers.    
Government Punishment 
When respondents were asked if other government or park authorities sanction 
bad natural resource management or rule breaking, 64. 8% stated they did and 35.2% 
said that they did not. Respondents who stated there was external punishment were 
almost 57 times more likely to state there was overharvesting in their community than 
other respondents, with a p value of 0.0148.  When respondents were asked if other 
agricultural harvesting besides range management was regulated in a fair manner for all 
members, 62.4% stated no and 37.6% stated yes.  Regulations for overharvesting are 
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generally perceived to be unjust whereas overgrazing regulations were perceived as just, 
as described in the previous section.  Due to the strength of this relationship it is 
apparent that the unjust perception of overharvesting regulations are causing more 
overharvesting when coupled with external government punishment.  Users can result to 
retaliation by exploiting the given resource when there is a centralized authority that is 
regulating the use of natural resources that are deemed to be owned by the community 
(Drijver, 1991).  Retaliation harvesting was not mentioned in the field.  However, it was 
evident on the ground that there was resentment regarding the harvesting of trees, 
particularly from users who had applied for permits to cut green wood and had been 
denied.  This resentment could be amplified if external parcel buyers are not being held 
to the same rules as communal members.  SEMERNAT needs to re-evaluate the minimal 
permit allowances as they have potentially lost more trees from the rejection of these 
permits through retaliation cutting.   Further inquiry into why there is more 
overharvesting with increases in external properties sold is also needed so that this 
resentment is not potentially amplified further.  
Groups 
It was originally thought that increased human organization could decrease 
overharvesting since institutions can serve as a safeguard for conservation (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999).  However, the presence of groups in communities was not found to be 
significant with overharvesting. 
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Summary 
Several important variables were found to influence the presence of 
overharvesting in communities in the park.  Respondents who stated that there was a 
microfinance group in their community were 57 times more likely to state that there was 
overharvesting than other respondents.  Increased vigilance on the use of natural 
resources where microfinance is occurring is suggested.  Respondents who used natural 
boundaries to exclude grazing from different livestock owners were less likely to state 
that there is overharvesting.  The absence of fences may have created a greater need to 
attend to animals and assure they are not damaging natural resources.  Promoting 
fencing for livestock grazing may not have any benefits, as natural boundaries are 
associated with a decreased presence of overharvesting.  Respondents who stated that 
properties were sold to external buyers were more likely to state there is overharvesting 
in their community as the number of parcels sold increased.  It is pertinent that the park 
makes sure that external buyers are following natural resource rules to avoid resentment 
in the communities.  Further research is needed to determine why there is more 
overharvesting when there are more external buyers.  The presence of groups in 
communities was not found to be statistically significant with overharvesting.  
Respondents who stated there was external punishment were almost 57 times more 
likely to state there is overharvesting in their community.  The majority of respondents 
(62.4%) thought that natural resource regulations other than pasture were not fair.  
External government punishment held an opposite relationship with overgrazing.  The 
majority (88.9%) of the respondents perceived pasture regulation as fair and external 
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government punishment was related to reduced overgrazing.  Thus, it was suspect that 
retaliation harvesting was occurring for resources other than pasture.  The regulations of 
natural resources other than pasture need to be revisited, and sustainable harvest limits 
may need to be considered to reduce retaliation harvesting.    
Compensation Potential 
 Mexico has a payment services program on select watersheds where there is not 
commercial forestry and where there is water scarcity in the region.  Currently the 
payment program is funded by federal earmarked water taxes.  Local funding was 
discarded in the first project round due to lack of immediate prospects.  Thus the 
existence of a local payment for environmental services was made part of the 
applications grading system.  To solve targeting issues of not getting to the poorest of 
the poor the system has added a weight in the application grading system to include 
poverty as well.  The federal payment rate was fixed to M$300/ha ((US$27.3) annually 
and M$400/ha (US$36.4) for cloud forests (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008).  However 
Cumbres de Monterrey does not seem to be included presently in this federal program.  
As the federal government had identified this as an important criteria Cumbres de 
Monterrey could be a good location to try a local payment for environmental services. 
 An analysis  of the implementation for a Hydrological Environmental Services 
mechanism in Cumbres de Monttery has been conducted with contingent valuation, cost 
of opportunity, and restoration costs. The research suggests that the society is conscious 
of the importance of the conservation of the area and a willingness to pay. The study 
reveals that households are willing to pay M$6.80 a month (USD $ 0.60) in the eight 
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municipalities around the park.  Surface water proved 55% of the provision of water 
from the park and underground aquifers provide 45%.  The underground aquifers have a 
deficit from overexploitation.  The majority of the deforestation in the park has been a 
result of forest fires.  The cost of restoration could be between $5,161 and $9,485 USD 
(Saldivar et al., 2013).  Cumbres de Monterrey could be a great pilot to try a locally 
funded  payment for environmental services for areas that do not meet the federal 
governments present ranking criteria.  Assistance for comunidad and ejido members that 
were not located near the main road and who did not received benefits from tourism or 
frequent park monitoring was pressing. Such a program could have improved 
conservation outcomes and benefits for communal members in the park.  Such a 
program involves multiple government actors which could increase transaction costs.  
Since water is federally subsidized in Mexico perhaps action at the federal level could 
facilitate this further. 
4.2.3 Trust to Follow the Rules 
When respondents are asked “How well do you trust other community members 
to follow the established rules?”, 57% selected “always,” 13.7% selected “usually,” 
22.3% selected “sometimes,” and 6.9% selected “never.”  The responses are skewed 
toward positive sentiments.  Figure 10 shows a distribution of the responses.  In a 
laboratory trust experiment .67 of the participants choose a mutually beneficial option, 
over .37 chose to act selfishly on their behalf and further gain more money.  
Furthermore, .67 of the players trust the other player to choose the mutually beneficial 
option and only .37 chose an option of self-protection from the other player’s potentially 
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selfish choice (McCabe et al., 2003).  This finding is inconsistent with outcome-based 
models but predicted by the trust and reciprocity hypothesis (McCabe et al., 2003), and 
is consistent with the distribution of responses found here.  It is of concern that the few 
who act selfishly on their behalf may erode trust and deteriorate rule compliance.  
Institutions must continually uphold expectations to fight off the natural state of 
deterioration (Runge, 1981).  This model explores factors that promote or deteriorate 
trust in communities to provide information that will assist in fighting off the natural 
state of deterioration of trust in rule compliance.  Results are displayed in Table 9.  Trust 
in community members is likely to influence not only the action of the individuals but 
also the compliance to rules at different institutional scales: local, park, and federal.   
 
 
 
Figure 10. Trust for Other Community Members to Follow the Rules.  Each column represents the 
category selected when respondents were asked how often they trusted other community members to 
follow the rules.   
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Table 9. Ordinal Logit Regression Results of Trust to Follow the Rules 
 
 
Transparency 
Transparency was included in this study as a survey variable due to its reference 
in literature as an essential component of communal land management (Nelson & 
Agrawal, 2008; Blaikie, 2006; Child, 1996).  When respondents were asked if the 
community was managed in a transparent way, 5% selected “never,” 19.7% selected 
“sometimes,” 16.1% selected “usually,” and 59.2% selected “always.”  In the first 
model, “always” was the only significant response and the model did not pass the Score 
Test for the Proportional Odds Assumption.  To get the model to pass the Score Test for 
the Proportional Odds Assumption, the three non-significant options were merged: 
Dependent Independent 
    Foll_rul (cm_trsnp, gz_haprm, cmnc_NtR, Rcom_mad, RuleB_pn) 
 
 Variable 
Code DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr>ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1 -0.0169 0.6966 0.0006 0.9807 
Intercept 2 1 3.0327 0.7054 18.4843 <.0001 
Intercept 3 1 4.0728 0.7408 30.2293 <.0001 
cm_trnsp 1* 1 -2.2912 0.3775 36.8431 <.0001 
gz_haprm  
1 -0.00025 0.000089 8.0623 0.0045 
cmnc_NtR 2 1 -0.9388 0.4945 3.6043 0.0576 
cmnc_NtR 3 1 -1.3588 0.481 7.9808 0.0047 
cmnc_NtR 4 1 -1.3891 0.5272 6.9413 0.0084 
Rcom_mad 1 1 -1.4655 0.6043 5.8821 0.0153 
RuleB_pn 1 1 -0.7278 0.362 4.0415 0.0444 
  
Cases Included in Analysis 
N=157 
(66.8%) 
    
 
-2 Log Likelihood 345.453 
  
  
Correct Model Prediction 
Percentage Correct 
80.8 
    
*1, 2, and 3 were merged to 0, and 4 was changed to 1 for cm_trsnp.  4 was significant and 
the others were not in the prior model that would not pass the score test. 
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never, sometimes, and usually.  The merged categories were changed to 0 and “always” 
was changed to 1.  When respondents selected “always” they were less likely to state 
that they trusted members to follow the rules, with a p value of <0.0001 and an estimated 
regression coefficient of -2.2912.  A one unit increase in transparency going from 0 
(merged categories of less transparent) to 1 (always transparent) would expect to see a 
2.2912 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level of trust for members to follow 
the rules, given all of the other variables in the model are held constant.  When full 
disclosure is on the table, people may be more aware of the rule breaking that is 
occurring or the tendency of blurring the lines a little, further causing one to trust people 
less to follow the rules.  Frances Cleaver states: 
Transparency is a much advocated, but in my view, a much overrated 
requirement of institutional arrangements as many social relationships and 
transactions depend on a certain degree of blurring the rules, of  looking the other 
way, ignoring contraventions of norms (Cleaver, 2002).   
To build more trust among community members, communities that are always managed 
transparently should be managed with less full disclosure.  A certain degree of disclosure 
is necessary; however, due to these results less frequent disclosure in completely 
transparent communities builds more trust.  The degree to which this disclosure should 
take place and how transparency should be managed is unknown, and further research 
needs to be conducted.  It is often assumed that transparency is an integral component of 
communal land management since it is a component of democracy.  It is important to 
realize that democratic institutions do not have complete transparency.  Thus, this notion 
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of transparency needs to be quantified and examined further to really understand what 
level of disclosure promotes trust in members following the rules as total disclosure has 
been found to reduce trust in this study.  Further research in this area is important for 
conservation rule compliance as 59.2% of the respondents stated that their communities 
are “always” managed in a transparent manner.  
Hectares Permitted for Grazing 
How smaller areas affect trust in members to follow the rules in this locality is 
unknown.  The aspect of size of the grazing area or the communal resource base is 
included in this model to understand the relationship further with trust to follow the 
rules.  When respondents were asked how many hectares they were allowed to graze, 68 
different values were reported with a range from 0-11600 hectares.  When the responses 
are grouped, 56% of the respondents stated that they had between 0-100 hectares 
permitted for grazing, 16.5% stated that they had between 125-500 hectares, 13.2% 
stated they had between 600-2,500 hectares, and 14.3% stated they have between 2,965-
11,600 hectares permitted for grazing.  For every one-hectare increase, respondents were 
less likely to trust members to follow the rules, with a p-value of 0.0045 and an 
estimated coefficient of -0.00025.  A one unit increase in the hectares permitted for 
grazing would expect to see a 0.00025 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level 
of trust for members to follow the rules, given all of the other variables in the model are 
held constant.  This can have a larger effect over many hectares.  In a study in Ethiopia, 
communities with smaller areas of restricted grazing showed higher levels of collective 
action for grazing land management, such as communities paying for a guard, 
 91 
 
establishment of penalty systems, and reporting few violations (Gebremedhin et al., 
2004).  The result here do not necessarily signify that the permitted grazing areas should 
be made smaller; size, composition, levels of dependence on the resource, prevailing 
norms, and types of technology employed to use the resource have an impact on the 
resource management because they affect the interaction of different actors around 
conservation (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999).  However, multiple monitors may change this 
relationship and improve trust in members following the rules in communities that have 
larger grazing areas. 
Frequency of Communication about Natural Resource Management 
In a review of the social learning literature for natural resource management 
there was a general consensus that processes that support social learning involve 
sustained interaction between stakeholders with and ongoing deliberation and sharing of 
knowledge in a trusting environment (Cundill & Rodella, 2012).  Thus here that 
sustained interaction in the form of communication frequency about natural resources 
management was included to see its possible influence on trust in members to follow the 
rules.  When respondents were asked “How often do you communicate with other 
community members about resource management,” 34.5% of respondents stated “ever 
few months,” 26.3% of respondents stated “monthly,” 21.1% stated “weekly,” and 
18.1% stated “daily”.  Respondents who selected monthly were less likely to have trust 
in members following the rules than the base of every few months with a p value of 
0.0576 and an estimated coefficient of -0.9388.  A one unit increase in the frequency of 
communication about natural resource management from 1 (every few months) to 2 
 92 
 
(monthly) would expect to see a 0.9388 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher 
level of trust for members to follow the rules, given all of the other variables in the 
model are held constant. This is not significant at the 95% confidence level.  
Respondents who selected that they communicate weekly about natural resource 
management were less likely to trust members to follow the rules than respondents that 
communicated every few months, with a p value of 0.0047 and an estimated coefficient 
of -1.35.  An increase in the frequency of communication about natural resource 
management from 1 (every few months) to 3 (weekly) would expect to see a 1.35 
decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level of trust for members to follow the 
rules, given all of the other variables in the model are held constant. Respondents that 
selected that they communicate daily were also less likely to trust members to follow the 
rules when compared to respondents that communicated every few months with a p 
value of 0.0084 and an estimated coefficient of -1.39.  An increase in the frequency of 
communication about natural resource management from 1 (every few months) to 2 
(daily) would expect to see a 1.39 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level of 
trust for members to follow the rules, given all of the other variables in the model are 
held constant.  Communication is influencing others trust negatively.  It was originally 
though that the relationship would be the inverse and that increased communication 
would serve as a rule enforcement strategy to improve trust.  Communication frequency 
may be measuring the differences in communities in terms of local politics, strategic 
interactions, and the possibility of layered alliances.  Agrawal & Gibson (1999) state 
that, “we often view community as a unified organic whole and this vision fails to attend 
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to these differences.”  While communicating every few months is perhaps better than 
weekly or daily communications this may not resolve the underlying problem of 
disagreements.  There are two streams of thought regarding social learning in the 
literature.  One focuses on the learning experienced and the types of outcomes that arise 
from attendance in participatory workshops and similar activities.  Another focuses on 
learning in groups, networks, and associations that have framed social learning as a 
process that results in a change in resource management practices, or how things are 
done (Rodela, 2011).  The negative result received here between trust in members to 
follow the rules and communication frequency could suggest that participatory 
workshops might be a better venue here.  Further research is needed to understand what 
aspects of communication frequency caused reduced trust.    
Rules Community Made 
When respondents were asked, “Are management rules within the community 
created by members of this community,” 92.3% of the respondents stated yes and 7.7% 
of the respondents said no.   Respondents who selected that rules were made in the 
community were less likely to trust members to follow the rules, with a p value of 
0.0153 and an estimated coefficient of -1.4655.  A one unit increase in rules being 
community made from 0 (rules not community made) to 1 (rules are community made) 
would expect to see a 1.4655 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level of trust 
for members to follow the rules, given all of the other variables in the model are held 
constant.  Runge (1981) states that “even in small groups, the strategy of defection is still 
dominant without enforcement from outside.”  External checks and balances have been 
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promoted since the beginning of the literature in this field (Ostrom, 2000; Agrwal & 
Gibson, 1999).  The question remains, however, to the degree of external enforcement 
that builds trust and the degree of external enforcement that undermines communal 
management.  Further research regarding the types of external rules that build trust is 
needed to understand this relationship further. 
Rule Breakers Punished 
Graduated sanctions are an important part of Ostrom’s (1990) and Wade’s (1988 
& 1994)  signature work that define principles that can lead to successful communal 
management.  However, the results received here suggest the contrary for the surveyed 
area.  When respondents were asked if rule breakers were punished, 37% stated that rule 
breakers were not punished and 62.9% stated that they are punished.  Respondents who 
stated that rule breakers were punished were less likely to trust members to follow the 
rules than other respondents, with a p value of 0.0444 and an estimated coefficient of -
0.7278.   A one unit increase in rule breakers punished from 0 (rule breakers are not 
punished) to 1 (rule breakers are punished) would expect a 0.7278 decrease in the log 
odds of being in a higher level of trust for members to follow the rules, given all of the 
other variables in the model are held constant.  Justice and fairness perceptions regarding 
the punishment are likely to influence the response to punishment (Arvey & Jones, 1985; 
Ball et al., 1993).  
It is suspected that this result is picking up part of the unfair sentiments (62.4%) 
of restrictions for overharvesting.  The fact that this unjust perception of natural resource 
rules and sanctions possibly makes respondents trust members less to follow the rules 
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begs a review of the harvesting rules in the park as they may be causing more resource 
degradation than conservation in communal lands.  Sustainable harvest limits in 
communal lands with more communal say in natural resource regulations will be 
pertinent to restore trust in members following the rules.  Rule enforcement alone will 
not resolve this problem and only make it worse.  Further research into why punishments 
deteriorate trust is needed. 
Summary 
The majority of respondents had positive sentiments of trust for users to follow 
the rules.  However, several significant relationships that potentially affect user’s 
negative sentiments of distrust of users to follow the established rules were found.  
Respondents from the communities that are always managed transparently have less trust 
in members following the rules than other respondents.  Thus, it is suggested that there 
be a slight limitation of transparency to build trust.  Further research is needed to 
understand what aspects and degree of full transparency create distrust.  Communities 
with larger permitted grazing areas have more distrust in members following the rules.  
It is suggested that multiple monitors be employed which would also assist in reducing 
overgrazing, particularly in large permitted grazing areas.  Respondents who 
communicate more frequently with members about natural resource management have 
greater distrust in members following the rules.  This reflects not only how others can 
influence our opinions but also the possibility of local alliances and divisions at play.  
Further research is needed to understand what aspects of communication frequency are 
causing reduced trust.   Community members were found to have more trust in members 
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to follow the rules when rules were not community made.  Further research regarding the 
types of external rules that build trust is needed to understand this relationship further.  
Punishment of rule breakers reduces respondents’ trust in members to follow the rules.  
Since 62.4% of the respondents saw overharvesting rules other than pasture as unjust, 
natural resource rules in the park and in communities in the park need further review and 
community involvement in the formation of these rules.  It is believed that the unjust 
perception of rules is why punishment reduced trust, because justice and fairness 
perceptions regarding the punishment are likely to influence the response to punishment 
(Ball et al., 1993; Arvey & Jones, 1985) causing retaliation harvesting
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSION 
This research was conducted to further inform policy and management strategies 
for sustainable land management amongst communal members that have boundaries in 
the Cumbres de Monterrey National Park.    Household surveys were collected in 
communal lands that have boundaries within the Cumbres de Monterrey National Park 
to determine variables that influence park promoted conservation, sustainable land 
management, and institutional success. Using the survey data, logistical regression 
models were estimated to link the perceptions on park-promoted conservation, 
overgrazing, overharvesting, and trust in communal members to follow rules with 
institutional characteristics and other independent variables.  One model was run to 
understand how effectively conservation is being promoted amongst communities by the 
park and what variables have contributed to conservation promotion.  Two models were 
run to understand factors that affect overharvesting and overgrazing in these 
communities.  Another model was run regarding rule following and how well 
community members trust others to follow the rules to see what variable promote 
institutional success.  Backward conditional analysis was used to eliminate variables that 
did not hold a significant relationship using SAS statistical software.  Many variables 
were eliminated, and suitable bases for developing the models were achieved.  Many 
significant relationships were found, and based on these results several conclusions can 
be drawn.   The main conclusions drawn for this research is that rules that are not just do 
not work, there is strong potential for locally funded payment for environmental services 
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to alleviate some of the injustice surrounding felling restrictions, and the park could 
improve their public relations amongst inhabitants.  
5.1 Conclusions 
5.1.1 Conservation, Resource Management, and Governance 
Conservation Promotion 
Trying to promote a locally funded payment for watershed recharge services 
project for inhabitants of the Cumbres de Monterrey park could improve conservation 
outcomes and perceptions in the park.  Promoting conservation amongst rotational 
grazers may be more difficult and could use further research and inquiry.  Communal 
lands could further promote conservation by clarifying boundaries amongst all 
communal members.   
Overgrazing 
To provide an offsetting deterrent for overgrazing in larger areas, multiple 
monitors and systematic livestock rotation could be helpful in reducing overgrazing.  
While compensation for labor schemes with few select participants did not work for park 
conservation promotion a change in the setup of a compensation scheme could have 
positive benefits to reduce overgrazing.  Overharvesting resources were perceived to be 
unjust.  It is suspect that the costs of not being able to cut any live trees was much 
greater than the minimal conservation compensation being allocated for few.   Pasture 
regulation, on the other hand was perceived as just and external enforcement has been 
successful in reducing overgrazing.  Voluntary compensations schemes with community 
involvement in the allocation of resources could allow for rotational grazing and fallow 
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periods through city water fees.  In another study, poor farmers were the most willing to 
adjust their resource management for compensation (Swinton et al., 2003).  As the park 
is a water recharge zone and provides 70% of the water for the city of Monterrey 
(CONANP, 2013) and few grazers exist in the park, such a plan could result in tangible 
benefit for the city and the park.  Other studies show that there is a willingness to pay in 
the area.  External rule enforcement was effective when rules were perceived to be just 
and could result in retaliation harvesting when they are not.  Comunidades  were more 
likely to state that there is overgrazing and the more defined ejido structure with 
registered beneficiaries is possibly reducing grazing pressures.  Many comunidades 
mentioned the desire to transition to an ejido structure through PROCEDE.  The park 
may help expedite their application with PROCEDE to potentially reduce overgrazing in 
comunidades. 
Overharvesting 
Overharvesting rules and regulations were not perceived to be just and the 
presence of external sanctions was related to overharvesting.  Rules and enforcement 
will not work when rules are perceived to be unjust.  Communities with low population 
pressures and sustainable harvest rates have shown to have the same forest cover as strict 
protected areas without human settlement.  SEMERNAT should reconsider sustainable 
harvest allocations within the park as revenge harvesting was already occurring, 
reducing conservation benefits.  Particularly as illegal felling practices often optimize 
the healthiest trees reducing the long term health of the forest.  The presence of 
microfinance groups was strongly related to overharvesting and increased monitoring in 
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these areas is needed.  The absence of fences may have created a greater need to attend 
to animals and assure they are not damaging natural resources.  Promoting fencing of 
animals for natural resource management does not appear to have any significant 
advantage for conservation.  An increase in parcels sold to outside buyers has resulted in 
overharvesting and increased monitoring in these areas is needed.  Depending on the title 
arrangement, external buyers may or may not be allowed access to communal grazing 
areas.  Communities need to enforce community rules and clarify resource regulations 
with external buyers.   The park needs to monitor areas with more external buyers more 
frequently than other areas. 
Institutional Success 
Communities that are always transparent have reduced levels of trust.   Further 
research is needed to determine what aspects of complete transparency deter trust.  
Larger grazing areas are associated with decreasing levels of trust.  Multiple monitors 
should be employed to increase trust in communities with larger grazing areas.  If 
communities cannot afford multiple monitors, the park may need to assist in mobilizing 
resources for more monitors.   There were decreasing levels of trust when rules were 
community made and a certain degree of external rules builds trust.   However, the 
presence of punishment decreases levels of trust.  It is questionable if internal or external 
sanctions are harsh or perceived as unjust.  Revisiting overharvesting rules and their 
associated punishment in communities, with external actors is needed.   
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5.2 Implications 
The results and conclusions from my study have several implications for policy 
and conservation as follows.   
5.2.1 Conservation, Resource Management, and Governance 
Conservation Promotion 
Very clear pasture boundaries amongst all community members could improve 
conservation promotion.  While the department of agrarian reform has publically 
available maps with boundaries only one male family member attends the ejido 
meetings.  Assuring that boundaries are clear with all members could have positive 
conservation outcomes not only for communal lands within the park but throughout 
Mexico.   Further research is need to understand why compensations schemes were 
reducing conservation practices and why rotational grazers have a negative disposition 
toward park conservation practices.  Federal programs in Mexico are using payment for 
forest land owners in hydrological recharge zones to prevent owners from deforesting 
their land and are voluntary.  There is federal motivation to have locally funded 
initiatives and areas that do not meet the federal priority criteria and have a willingness 
to pay are prime areas to pilot such a scheme.  Other national parks in Mexico with 
communal land inhabitants could also potentially benefit from several actions suggested 
here: 
 Assessing local willingness to pay for water recharge payment schemes that 
provide payment to forest owners. 
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 Assuring that communities clarify pasture boundaries amongst all communal 
members.   
 Involving natural resource users that may have rich local conservation 
knowledge in focus group discussions and utilizing that information to influence 
conservation policy and management in the park.   
Sustainable Management 
External resource regulations that are perceived to be just and associated 
government punishment can improve conservation outcomes.  Rules that are not just 
however only deteriorate conservation outcomes further.  While many resource rules are 
made at a federal level, local perceptions need to be taken into account and flexibility on 
harvest schemes needs to be allowed with external enforcement to improve conservation 
outcomes.  Recent studies have shown that forest communities with minimal population 
pressure and sustainable felling can provide equal conservation benefits as strictly 
protected parks without human settlement (Bray et al., 2008).  Multiple resource 
monitors for larger communal areas could reduce overgrazing.  Further research is 
needed to inquire why this is occurring.  Further research and inquiry is needed to 
determine how external buyers and the presence of microfinance are increasing the 
presence of overharvesting.   
Institutional Success 
Several institutional characteristics were associated with improved trust in 
members following the rules.  Respondents with smaller grazing areas had greater trust 
compared to those with larger grazing areas.  Respondents who communicated about 
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natural resource management every few months had greater levels of trust.  When rules 
were not made by the community, respondents had greater trust in members following 
the rules.   The absence of punishment was also associated with higher levels of trust.  
Research is needed to clarify and validate these relationships.  Further research is also 
needed to understand when transparency starts to erode trust and when it further builds 
it.  As there are different fairness perceptions regarding different resources further 
research is needed to understand what types of rules and punishment build and erode 
trust in members following the rules.  
5.3 Limitations 
This is only a case study that looked at the comunidad and ejido organizational 
structure.  This study area had the greatest density of communidades in the state of 
Nuevo Leon (Departamento Agraria); however, there were only 7 communities included 
in this study.  Further research with more comunidades could give greater insight into 
the institutional benefits and costs between ejido and comunidades organizational 
structures.  A larger sample size and follow up surveys were unable to be conducted due 
to the escalating security concerns in the area.  Due to the limited number of women 
respondents, significant differences in responses between genders could not be tested 
using the Man-Whitney test.      
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  Concepts were summarized and organized from Baland and Platteau (1996), Wade (1988 & 1994), and Ostrom (1990) 
 
 128 
 
APPENDIX  B 
 129 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
 130 
 
 
 131 
 
 
 132 
 
 
 133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 134 
 
Two questions were added on to the end of the survey: 
1. Has anyone come to your community to offer a training?  If so, whom, and 
how frequently do they come?  
2. How are decisions made in our household? 
100%-Man  75%-Man  50/50  75%-Woman  100%-Woman 
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